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Abstract
Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector-borne disease transmitted by a broad spectrum of mosquito species,
especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals (domestic and wild ruminants and camels) and humans.
Rift Valley fever is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula, with periodic epidemics
characterised by 5–15 years of inter-epizootic periods. In the last two decades, RVF was notified in new
African regions (e.g. Sahel), RVF epidemics occurred more frequently and low-level enzootic virus
circulation has been demonstrated in livestock in various areas. Recent outbreaks in a French overseas
department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey, Tunisia and Libya raised the attention of the
EU for a possible incursion into neighbouring countries. The movement of live animals is the most
important pathway for RVF spread from the African endemic areas to North Africa and the Middle East.
The movement of infected animals and infected vectors when shipped by flights, containers or road
transport is considered as other plausible pathways of introduction into Europe. The overall risk of
introduction of RVF into EU through the movement of infected animals is very low in all the EU regions
and in all MSs (less than one epidemic every 500 years), given the strict EU animal import policy. The
same level of risk of introduction in all the EU regions was estimated also considering the movement of
infected vectors, with the highest level for Belgium, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands (one epidemic every
228–700 years), mainly linked to the number of connections by air and sea transports with African RVF
infected countries. Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an imminent risk of
RVFV introduction, the risk of further spread into countries neighbouring the EU and the risks of possible
introduction of infected vectors, suggest that EU authorities need to strengthen their surveillance and
response capacities, as well as the collaboration with North African and Middle Eastern countries.
© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf
of European Food Safety Authority.
Keywords: Rift Valley Fever, introduction, vectors, mosquitoes, livestock, transmission
Requestor: European Commission
Question number: EFSA-Q-2019-00422
Correspondence: alpha@efsa.europa.eu
EFSA Journal 2020;18(3):6041www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal
Panel members: Søren Saxmose Nielsen, Julio Alvarez, Dominique Joseph Bicout, Paolo Calistri,
Klaus Depner, Julian Ashley Drewe, Bruno Garin-Bastuji, Jose Luis Gonzales Rojas, Christian Gortazar
Schmidt, Virginie Michel, Miguel Angel Miranda Chueca, Helen Clare Roberts, Liisa Helena Sihvonen,
Karl Stahl, Antonio Velarde Calvo, Arvo Viltrop and Christoph Winckler.
Acknowledgements: The EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare wishes to thank the following
for the support provided to this scientific output: Laure Dommergues, Claire Donohue, Laura Gonzalez
Villeta. The Panel wishes to acknowledge all European competent institutions, Member State bodies
and other organisations that provided data for this scientific output: Dr H€useyin Yilmaz, Veterinary
Faculty of the University of Istanbul,Turkey; Clemence Bourely, La€etitia Thibaudeau and Severine
Rautureau, Direction generale de l’alimentation, Ministere de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, France;
Mahmoud Mohamed Ali Abdelhakim and Mariem Magdy, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation,
Egypt; Riham Bassam and Elias Ibrahim, Ministry of Agriculture, Lebanon; Mahmoud Al Hanatleh,
Ministry of Agriculture, Jordan.
Suggested citation: Nielsen SS, Alvarez J, Bicout DJ, Calistri P, Depner K, Drewe JA, Garin-Bastuji B,
Rojas JLG, Schmidt CG, Michel V, Chueca MAM, Roberts HC, Sihvonen LH, Stahl K, Calvo AV, Viltrop A,
Winckler C, Bett B, Cetre-Sossah C, Chevalier V, Devos C, Gubbins S, Monaco F, Sotiria-Eleni A, Broglia A,
Abrahantes JC, Dhollander S, Van Der Stede Y and Zancanaro G, 2020. Rift Valley Fever – epidemiological
update and risk of introduction into Europe. EFSA Journal 2020;18(3):6041, 72 pp. https://doi.org/10.
2903/j.efsa.2020.6041
ISSN: 1831-4732
© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf
of European Food Safety Authority.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs License,
which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and no
modifications or adaptations are made.
The EFSA Journal is a publication of the European Food
Safety Authority, an agency of the European Union.
Rift Valley Fever
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 2 EFSA Journal 2020;18(3):6041
Summary
No RVF outbreaks in humans or animals have been reported in Europe or in European Union (EU)
neighbouring countries so far, although RVF reappeared after 10 years in a French overseas
Department (Mayotte) with outbreaks involving multiple human cases in 2018–2019. Besides this
reoccurrence, a legislative process triggered a mandate from the European Commission to European
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to perform a risk assessment on RVF. The Commission adopted a draft
Commission Delegated Regulation which supplements Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 (Animal
Health Law), laying down rules for the prevention and control of transmissible animal diseases, and
that replaces existing Directives, such as Directive 92/119/EEC which currently provides for measures
to apply in the event of occurrence of certain diseases, which includes RVF. Additionally, in accordance
with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1882, RVF is categorised as a Category A
disease.
Following the categorisation and the proposed changes to the measures for RVF, the Commission
requested a complete risk assessment on RVF (risk of introduction, exposure and effectiveness of
prevention and control measures), since the measures proposed in the Delegated Regulation should be
based on the latest scientific knowledge.
In particular, it was requested to provide an update of the global epidemiological situation in
relation to RVF with emphasis on areas posing a higher risk for the EU. Moreover, the overall risk of
introduction of RVF into the EU (combining rate of entry, RVFV transmission and establishment) should
be assessed at regional level (considering the EU regions as specified in a 2017 EFSA scientific opinion
on vector-borne diseases) and for each single MS. Regarding the recent epidemics in Mayotte the
probability of overwintering of RVF, the risk of RVF spreading from Mayotte to other areas as well as
the impact of the disease on animal health and farm production should be assessed. Additionally, the
assessment of effectiveness of preventive and control measures in eliminating or reducing the disease
impact in Mayotte as well as different surveillance strategies in animals that may be used for detection
and possible prediction of RVF recurrence in Mayotte should be carried out. Finally, while considering
the risk of RVF introduction into the EU, the surveillance measures for early detection of the disease as
well as the feasibility, availability and effectiveness of the prevention and control measures for RVF
should be evaluated, especially the ones foreseen in the above-mentioned Commission Delegated
Regulation.
The present opinion deals with the update of the global epidemiological situation in relation to RVF
with emphasis on areas posing a higher risk for the EU and with an assessment of the overall risk of
introduction of RVF into the EU. Two further scientific outputs will be produced to address the other
requested points.
For the update on the global epidemiological situation of RVF, descriptive statistics and information
from the literature and national authorities were used. Outbreak data from World Organisation for
Animal Health (OIE), Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS), WHO, trade data from EUROSTAT
and UN COMtrade and information obtained by French authorities and OIE representatives in Middle
East were collected and considered.
Rift Valley fever is a vector-borne disease transmitted by a broad spectrum of mosquito species,
Aedes and Culex genus being the most relevant, to animals (domestic and wild ruminants, camels) and
humans. RVF has been present historically in Africa in sub-Saharan areas and in specific zones of the
Arabian Peninsula, on the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Historically, in these endemic
areas, major RVF epidemics have been periodically observed, usually with long inter-epizootic periods
(5–15 years) during which the virus was not detected in domestic animal populations.
In the last two decades, some changes in the RVF epidemiology were recorded: more evidence has
been observed on the spread of RVFV into new African areas, not regarded as infected before, even in
locations considered not optimal for mosquito-borne diseases, like Sahel areas. Moreover, regarding
RVF recurrence, epidemics have been recorded more frequently and low-level enzootic RVFV
circulation in livestock has been demonstrated in various areas.
Outbreaks in a French overseas department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey and
Tunisia raised concerns for the EU regarding a possible incursion into countries neighbouring
continental EU and/or with direct trade links. Positive serological findings in Algeria, Western Sahara,
Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, which are or were countries considered officially free from RVF, must
be carefully interpreted on the bases of the study designs and diagnostic tests used. However, the
repeated detection of serological positive individuals (animals or humans) in these countries must be
seen as a signal of a potential risk of RVF spread out of its endemic geographical area.
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In this regard, the movement of live animals is the main risk factor for RVF spread from the African
endemic areas. Several pathways of livestock movements between sub-Saharan and North African
countries can be identified. Moreover, the trade from the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula
and Middle East involves several millions of live animals each year, thus representing a constant risk of
RVF introduction into the Middle East.
Among available diagnostic tools, molecular assays for RVFV detection are available and, more
recently, a pen-side test for early detection of viraemic animals. Serological tests to detect RVF
antibodies that are able to distinguish early from past RVFV infection in domestic ruminants are also
available. As for the EU preparedness, the diagnostic capacity of laboratories among EU Member
countries and in the Mediterranean region has been assessed and the level of performance considered
adequate as well as in National Laboratories from Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Mali and
Senegal. Nevertheless, an evaluation of the performance of diagnostic tests in place in most of the
other Mediterranean countries should be encouraged through inter-laboratory trials.
Regarding vaccines against RVF, no vaccines have been authorised for use in the EU. However,
both live-attenuated and inactivated vaccines are commercially available for RVF and have contributed
significantly to the control of RVF in endemic countries. Some limitations are linked to the need of
repeated vaccinations for inactivated vaccines, and some safety issues arise for the live-attenuated
vaccines. Novel DIVA vaccines, including accompanying DIVA tests, are in the final stages of validation.
The risk of introduction of RVFV into EU was assessed by using a model already presented in an
earlier risk assessment by EFSA (2017) for 36 vector-borne diseases. This model is called MINTRISK
(Method to INTegrate all relevant RISK aspects) and allows the assessment of the risk of introduction,
transmission and impact of vector-borne diseases in a systematic, semi-quantitative way, and can be
used for risk evaluation, risk comparison and risk ranking of possible vector-borne diseases of livestock.
The risk of introduction of RVF assessed by MINTRISK derives from the combination of the rate of entry
(of the pathogen), level of transmission (as the basic reproduction number) and probability of
establishment of RVF in the EU (the chance for RVF to be further transmitted, linked to the presence of
susceptible hosts and conditions), along the relevant pathways of introduction of the disease.
First, the possible pathways for RVF introduction were reviewed. The role of infected animals,
infected vectors, contaminated products and infected humans was considered; and it was concluded
that the movement of infected animals (legally traded or uncontrolled movements) and of infected
vectors by active flight or their passive transport when shipped by flights, containers or road transport
could be considered as plausible pathways of introduction and were therefore further considered in the
assessment.
The rate of RVFV entry into the EU through the entry of infected animals is assessed as ‘very low’
(considering the scale of qualitative assessment of MINTRISK, which corresponds, in the worst-case
scenario, to one entry every 500 years), this is linked to the strict trade rules on animal import, which
basically prevent any import of animals from RVF-affected countries, whereas through the introduction
of infected vectors is considered ‘low’ for France (median: 0.000282 entries/year; CI: 8.9*107;
0.056), Germany (median: 0.000251 entries/year; CI: 3.9*10-7;0.11) and the Netherlands (median:
0.000251 entries/year; CI: 106; 0.056), due to the greater number of connections by air and sea
transports with African RVF-infected countries. Due to the level of uncertainty, other countries (Cyprus,
Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal) showed greater rates of entry of vectors (up to 0.06 entries
per year) when the upper 95% confidence values are considered. This level of uncertainty is linked to
the number of air and sea connections between affected countries and MSs, especially the maritime
connections which generate higher uncertainty for the survival of mosquitoes at the destination.
For all MS, the level of transmission (referred as the R0, basic reproduction number) has been
assessed as ‘moderate’. This is linked to the presence of RVF competent vectors in all MS, the same
estimated value of the basic reproduction ratio for all MSs and full susceptibility of animal hosts in all MS.
The probability of the establishment of RVFV transmission, once introduced, varies among the EU
MS according to the introduction pathway considered: for the introduction through infected animals, a
‘very high’ probability (median 0.28, confidence interval, CI: 0.11–0.70) of RVFV transmission has been
estimated for Greece, Malta and Portugal, ‘high to very high’ for Cyprus (median: 0.1, CI:0.02–0.35)
and Italy (median: 0.1, CI:0.02–0.35); ‘high’ probability is considered for Belgium (median: 0.028,
CI:0.01–0.071) and the Netherlands (median: 0.028, CI:0.011–0.071); ‘moderate to high’ for Croatia
(median: 0.01, CI:0.002–0.039) and France (median: 0.01, CI:0.002–0.035. For the introduction
through infected vectors, a ‘very high’ probability of RVFV transmission is assessed for Belgium,
Greece, Malta and the Netherlands, ‘high to very high’ for United Kingdom, a ‘high’ probability is
reported for Luxembourg, Portugal, and ‘moderate to high’ for Cyprus, Ireland, Italy. The differences
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observed between probability estimates according to the two introduction pathways (animal or vector)
are mainly due to differences in host density among the countries and the climatic conditions, which
are inputs for the estimation of probability of the first transmission step following the introduction of
infected vectors.
For the overall rate of introduction of RVF into the EU, through the animal pathway, the risk of RVF
introduction is very low for all the EU MSs (less than 0.002 epidemics/year, meaning at least one
epidemic in 500 years), given the strict health policies in place in the EU on the import of live animals
from RVF-infected Third Countries and due to the long distance between the countries actually
infected by RVF and the EU borders. For the vector pathway of introduction, the risk is very low for
the great majority of MSs, but it is very low to low, when considering the median values, for
Netherlands with 0.0044 epidemics/year (CI: 2.51*105; 1.58), meaning one epidemic every
227 years, followed by Malta with 0.0025 epidemics/year (CI: 5.62*106; 0.1.25), Belgium and Greece
(0.0014 epidemics/year, CI: 4.47*106; 0.39, one epidemic every 700 years). In the worst-case
scenario, and considering the uncertainty around these values (upper confidence intervals), some MS
may have higher risk of RVF introduction (0.04 epidemics/year for Belgium, Greece, Luxemburg,
Portugal and UK), and Netherlands and Malta may have one epidemic per year. This is mainly linked to
the number of connections by air and sea transports with African RVF-infected countries. Considering
the four EU regions (northern, southern, western and eastern EU), all of them are categorised as
having a very low risk of introduction of RVF, for the Southern region a median of 0.002 epidemics/
year (CI: 1.84*1040.028), in the Western region 0.002 epidemics/year (CI: 1.35*1040.03), in the
Northern region 0.00086 epidemics/year (CI: 1.22*10-50.0205), in the Eastern region 2.8*105
epidemics/year (CI: 5.71*1070.0011).
From the above conclusions, the following can be recommended. Considering the possible future
source of risks represented by the spread of infection into new areas closer to the EU borders, it is of
paramount importance for the EU to establish and maintain a close collaboration with North African
and Middle Eastern countries in the surveillance of possible introduction of RVF from currently infected
areas, as well as to carefully monitor the evolution of the epidemics in African countries.
Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an imminent risk of RVFV
introduction, the evolutions observed in the global situation of RVF occurrence, the risk of further
spread of infection into countries closer to EU borders and the risks linked to the possible introduction
of infected vectors, suggest EU authorities should strengthen, improve and harmonise their
surveillance and response capacities as well as their scientific and technical expertise to be better
prepared in case of RVFV introduction.
Considering the higher risk of introduction associated with the introduction of infected vectors, it is
recommended to integrate the surveillance systems already in place in the EU for invasive mosquitoes,
taking into account the main possible points of entry of RVFV-infected vectors. Particular attention
should be given to those countries that receive major air and sea traffic from RVF-affected countries.
Disinsection procedures (spraying insecticides) in flights are compulsory in some cases and widely
recommended by WHO and IATA. However, data about the efficacy of the treatments conducted in
airplanes and ships in order to avoid the entry of vectors arriving from RVF-affected countries, are
currently lacking.
Finally, considering a possible introduction of RVFV in the EU, information about the potential
mosquito vector species associated with livestock premises and the surrounding environment will be
essential to develop adequate protocols for vector control.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the European
Commission
General introduction and background information
Rift Valley Fever (RVF) is a disease affecting primarily domestic and wild ruminants (cattle, sheep,
goats), and camels. RVF is caused by a single-stranded RNA virus of the genus Bunyaviridae.
RVF is a vector-borne disease, transmitted primarily through various species of vectors (mainly
hematophagous mosquitoes). Certain species of vectors (e.g. Aedes mosquitoes) may act as reservoirs
of the disease during inter-epidemic periods thanks to their potential for transovarian (vertical)
transmission of the virus to their eggs. As a result, new generations of RVFV-infected mosquitoes may
hatch from infected eggs, especially in periods of favourable conditions (e.g. high rainfalls).
Susceptible animals are infected primarily by vector bites. Clinical signs range from sudden death or
abortion to mild, non-specific symptoms, depending on the virulence of the virus strain and the
species, breed and age of the affected animals. Mortality may reach 70–100% in lambs and kids, and
20–70% in adult sheep and calves. Abortion rates may reach 85–100% within the affected herds. RVF
in camels can cause abortions and neonatal deaths. Infected wild ruminants usually do not show any
clinical signs.
Humans can become infected by the RVF virus (RVFV), through the bites of vectors, by contact
with infected animals and animal materials (blood, discharges, abortion materials etc.) or by
consumption of untreated animal products (meat and milk). No human-to-human transmission has
been recorded to date. About 50% of infected humans have no clinical signs while others may
experience flu-like symptoms. A small percentage may develop severe clinical forms, involving
haemorrhagic fever with hepatic disease, meningoencephalitis or ocular complications. The total case
fatality rate varies between different epidemics (overall less than 1% in those documented).
To date, no RVF outbreaks in humans or animals have been reported in continental Europe or
countries sharing land borders with the continental areas of the EU. The closest RVF evidence available
are limited to serological findings from retrospective studies, carried out in Turkey, using blood samples
collected from camels, gazelles and buffaloes from 2000 to 2006.
Currently, the disease is endemic in large areas of Southern and Eastern Africa, where outbreaks of
RVF occur periodically (e.g. every few years), in seasons when weather conditions favour competent
vectors. In recent decades, large RVF epidemics have occurred in Egypt (1977-78, 1993, 2003),
Mauritania (2010, 2012, 2015), Madagascar (2007-2009), Comoros (2007) and elsewhere in the
African continent (Kenya, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Senegal etc.). Egypt and Libya currently marks
the northernmost limit of RVF spread. The disease moved outside the African continent for the first
time in 2000, into the Arab peninsula (Saudi Arabia and Yemen).
On 5 April 2017, EFSA, following a request from the Commission, adopted a scientific opinion on 36
vector-borne diseases, including RVF. The opinion concluded that the risk of introduction of RVF in the
EU was estimated to be very low based on a semi-quantitative method (modified MINTRISK model).
In Mayotte, a French department in the Indian Ocean, close to the Union of the Comoros islands
and Madagascar, human cases of RVF were detected for the first time in 2007. Retrospective
serological studies demonstrated the presence of RVF in livestock since 2004 (serological evidence).
Until recently, the disease appeared to be in remission with no new human cases detected since 2011.
However, in 2018, RVF reappeared in Mayotte and between 22 November 2018 and 14 March 2019,
more than 101 human cases and more than 60 outbreaks in ruminants have been reported.
In response to the RVF resurgence, the competent authorities of Mayotte have been implementing
surveillance and biosecurity measures, coupled with vector control/protection measures, aiming to limit
the overall disease spread and prevent animal-to-human transmission. In addition, movements of
ruminants and raw meat and milk thereof, originating from Mayotte, have been prohibited.
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts supplementing the rules laid down in Part
III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (Animal Health Law) on disease
control measures for listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9 (category A,
B and C diseases). Therefore, a draft Commission Delegated Regulation laying down rules for the
prevention and control of certain diseases has been developed and the draft is in consultation.
The rules laid down in the above-mentioned draft Commission Delegated Regulation are largely
‘taking over’ the rules currently in force concerning the disease control measures in the event of
animal diseases with serious effects on the livestock as they have proven to be effective in preventing
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the spread of those diseases within the Union. Consequently, animal disease control measures laid
down in existing Directives will be, to the extent that not already done by the Animal Health Law,
replaced by the rules provided in that Delegated Regulation. This is also the case of Directive 92/119/
EEC which currently provides for measures to apply in the event of occurrence of certain diseases. This
includes Rift Valley fever, which is in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/
1882, categorised as Category A disease.
In this regard, the existing rules of Directive 92/119/EEC will cease to apply, in particular for Rift
Valley fever, as from the date of application of the Animal Health Law and its complementing
legislation, i.e. from 21 April 2021. The proposed measures for the prevention and control of RVF
should be assessed in order to ensure that they are updated based on the latest scientific knowledge
in this new set of legislation.
Terms of Reference
1. RISK OF ENTRY OF RVF INTO THE CONTINENTAL PARTS OF THE EU
1.1 Provide an update of the global epidemiological situation in relation to RVF with emphasis on
areas posing a higher risk for the EU.
1.2 Provide an updated assessment of the overall risk of introduction of RVF (combined rate of
entry, vector transmission and establishment), separately for each one of the EU regions
potentially at risk, as specified in the 2017 EFSA scientific opinion on Vector-borne diseases
(VBD).
1.3 Provide a separate risk assessment of the risk of introduction of RVF for specific Member
States that may be at particular risk.
2. IMPACT OF RVF IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MAYOTTE AND RELEVANT CONTROL MEASURES
2.1 Assess the probability of overwintering of RVF in the department of Mayotte as well as the
risk of RVF spreading from Mayotte to other areas including other French departments in the
Indian Ocean or Metropolitan France.
2.2 Assess the impact of the disease (as defined in the ‘VBD opinion’), with emphasis on animal
health and farm production in Mayotte from the time of its initial occurrence to date.
2.3 Assess the possible short and long-term effectiveness, of different control measures, in
eliminating or reducing the disease impact in Mayotte (as per TOR 2.2 above), namely:
2.3.1 Stamping out of RVF outbreaks;
2.3.2 Establishment of a protection and a surveillance zone around RVF outbreaks;
2.3.3 Biosecurity measures, as the ones currently in place in Mayotte, coupled with personal
sanitary protection measures related to human–animal contact, including measures to
prevent consumption of potentially infected meat and milk;
2.3.4 Vector control and protection measures;
2.3.5 Vaccination of livestock
2.4 Assess the possible effectiveness of different surveillance strategies in animals that may be
used for RVF detection and possible prediction of RVF recurrence in Mayotte in the future, in
view of the diagnostic methods currently available.
3. SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL MEASURES FOR RVF [IN CASE OF OCCURRENCE OR HIGH RISK
OF RVF INCURSION IN EUROPE]
3.1 In case of high risk of RVF introduction in Europe assess and describe the surveillance
measures necessary to ensure early detection of the disease
3.2 In case of RVF occurrence in Europe, assess the effectiveness of the main available disease
prevention and control measures for RVF, including the relevant measures provided for in the
draft Commission Delegated Regulation on rules for the prevention and control of certain
listed diseases under Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases
(Animal Heath Law9), namely their potential to:
 limit the geographical spread of the disease reduce the number of outbreaks reduce the overall impact of the disease being present in an area for prolonged periods
(e.g. in case overwintering is possible)
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In particular, assess the feasibility, availability and effectiveness of:
3.2.1 the general measures set out in the enacting terms of Part I and II of draft Commission
Delegated Regulation
3.2.2 the disease-specific measures set out in Annexes I to X to draft Commission Delegated
Regulation
3.2.3 vaccination of listed species, including assessment of possible:
 risk mitigating measures necessary to be put in place for animals and products of
animal origin thereof, following vaccination
 surveillance performed after vaccination.
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference (if appropriate)
It was agreed with the European Commission to address the ToRs in three scientific opinions to be
delivered according to the following deadlines:
• January 2020 for the ToRs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3
• March 2020 for ToRs 2.1 and 2.2
• September 2020 for ToRs 2.3, 2.4 and 3.
In the first present opinion, the term of reference related to the risk of introduction of RVF into EU
will be addressed by providing an assessment of the rate of entry, the risk of vector transmission and
the probability of establishment of RVF as well as the combined overall risk of introduction of RVF first
for each single Member State, and then for the EU regions as in EFSA Panel on Animal Health and
Welfare (2017). This allows for a more complete and detailed scenario of risk of introduction of RVF
into EU, which is more useful for risk management purposes, since the risk is assessed for all MSs, and
not only for those at risk.
2. Data and methodologies
2.1. Data
Previous scientific outputs of EFSA on RVF (EFSA, 2005, 2013), outbreak and trade data were
collected in order to provide a description of the updated epidemiological situation and for the analysis
of the risk of introduction of RVF.
2.1.1. Epidemiological data
Epidemiological data of RVF outbreaks were obtained by OIE and ADNS for the animal outbreaks,
for African countries and MS (Mayotte, France), respectively, and from WHO for the notifications of the
human outbreaks.
2.1.2. Trade, travel and temperature data
Data related to the trade movement of large and small ruminants were collected from EUROSTAT
and UN COMtrade.1
Data related to flights, passengers, containers shipped on sea and road transport were obtained by
EUROSTAT.
Temperature data of 2013–2018 were obtained by the AgriCast resources Portal2 of the EU
Commission interpolated on a 25x25 km grid.
Other data and information sources considered were the REMESA network for North Africa and
Middle East countries as well as direct contact with OIE regional representatives and Chief Veterinary
Officers (CVOs) from France, Egypt, Chad, Mali, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.
1 UN Comtrade is a repository of official international trade statistics and relevant analytical tables. It provides free access to
detailed global trade data through API.
2 https://agri4cast.jrc.ec.europa.eu/DataPortal/Index.aspx?o=
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2.2. Methodologies
2.2.1. ToR 1.1: Global epidemiological situation in relation to RVF
For the first ToR about the update on the global epidemiological situation of RVF, both descriptive
statistics and information from the literature were used. The approach used was to update the
information provided in the RVF story map published by EFSA (link).
2.2.2. ToR 1.2 & 1.3: Risk of introduction to EU
The risk of introduction of RVF into each of the MSs and each of the EU regions is assessed by the
general framework of EFSA VBD_RISK model developed in MINTRISK as presented in EFSA Panel on
Animal Health and Welfare (2017), with some additional improvements.
The MINTRISK model is a tool to assess the level of introduction, transmission and impact of
vector-borne diseases. MINTRISK stands for Method to INTegrate all relevant RISK aspects; it is a tool
developed in Excel and Visual Basic. A web-based version with a central database and using Csharp for
underlying calculations has been created for practical use and access.3 This tool allows for a
systematic, semi-quantitative risk assessment, which can be used for risk evaluation, risk comparison
and risk ranking of possible vector-borne diseases of livestock.
The MINTRISK approach to assess the overall risk of pathogen/disease introduction into the EU
involves four steps as follows (Figure 1):
The possible pathways of introduction of RVF were discussed and selected based on literature and
expert knowledge. These are discussed in Section 3.2.1.
For each of the selected pathways, the probability of each step of the risk pathway was calculated.
First, the occurrence, rates of entry (number of entries/year), level of transmission (R0, basic
reproduction number) and probability of establishment were calculated separately, and then these
three values were combined into an overall rate of introduction (number of epidemics/year).
The calculation of the probability of each step for each pathway and each MS was based on the
answers to a set of questions to be addressed. Possible answers were qualitative categories (each with
its own underlying quantitative translation, see Annex A.4) associated with a level of the uncertainty
(low, moderate, high4). A Monte Carlo simulation was used to determine the overall uncertainty in the
probability for each step of the pathway and for the overall probability. For most of the questions, the
answer categories were given on a logarithmic scale and the outcomes were always expressed on a
logarithmic scale. The questions to be answered for each step are listed in Section 2.2.2.2.
The successive steps to assess the overall risks of introduction are as follows:
Figure 1: Steps for the MintRisk approach to assess the overall risk of pathogen/disease introduction
into the EU
3 https://www.wecr.wur.nl/mintrisk/ModelMgt.aspx
4 Three uncertainty levels can be selected to describe the certainty when answering the questions in the MINTRISK model. The
model will sample a value from triangular distributions with different ranges around the answer category according to the
chosen uncertainty level for a ‘moderate’ answer category. The ranges around the answer category are +/ 0.1 for low, +/ 0.3
for moderate and +/ 0.5 for high uncertainty (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2017).
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• Rates of introduction for MSs:
For each MS ‘n’ (with n ¼ 1;N total MSs), the overall rate of introduction is given by,
Rn ¼
Xall pathways
p¼1
Rn;p
where Rn,p is the rate of introduction for each pathway p. For each MS and each pathway, the rate Rn,P
is obtained using MINTRISK (see Annex A.5).
• Spatial model of rates of introduction:
The aim is to consider the N heterogeneous introduction rates R! all together at the geographical level
and combined them at the regional scale. To this end, a Bayesian CAR (conditional autoregressive) model
that takes into account the geographical heterogeneities of the Rn is developed as follows,
o Smooth the Rn as Rn ? ~Rn
o Simultaneously compute the introduction rates at the regional scale as, Rregion? ~Rregion where
Rregion ¼
Xall MSs2 region
n¼1
Rn
in which the summation stands for all MSs belonging to the EU region under consideration.
• Outcomes:
o ToR 1.3: Distributions of rates of introductionR! for each MS, reported as: median of Rn +
95% CI [2.5%; 97.5%] percentiles.
o ToR 1.2: Distributions of rates of introduction Rregion for each EU region, reported as:
median of Rn + 95% CI [2.5%; 97.5%] percentiles.
The four EU regions considered in the (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2017) are:
• Northern EU (N-EU): Lithuania, Denmark, Latvia, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Sweden, United
Kingdom;
• Southern EU (S-EU): Spain, Greece, Malta, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, Portugal, Cyprus;
• Western EU (W-EU): Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Austria;
• Eastern EU (E-EU): Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania.
2.2.2.1. Risk of introduction of RVFV by vectors
Vectors infected with RVFV from endemic countries can be introduced into an MS by different
means. In this opinion, we are only considering passive transport of vectors by means of transport
(mainly aerial and sea transportation) since other vector pathways, such as passive transport of
vectors by winds and active movement of the insects, were assumed to be negligible considering the
long distance between endemic countries included in this opinion and the EU MS.
The origin of introduction of RVFV-infected vectors to EU MS was focused only on those countries
where RVF outbreaks either in animals or humans were detected from 2006 to 2019 (Table 1).
Table 1: Countries that experienced at least one outbreak of RVF in human or animals since 2006
until 2019 according to OIE and WHO, with indication of the availability of data (Y is for
available) for air, sea and road transportation to the EU MS
Country OIE WHO Air Sea Road
1 Botswana 3
2 Central African Republic 1
3 Chad 1
4 Comoros 6
5 Democratic Republic of Congo 3
6 Egypt* Y Y
7 Gambia 1 Y
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A list of the vector species present in the selected countries was elaborated where the different
species of vectors were ranked according to their ability to be introduced into the EU based on their
ecology and vector capacity (Vectornet External Report, ref to be added). For example, vector species
that are able to breed in man-made containers were considered as having a higher risk to be
transported. From the list of selected vector species present in RVFV endemic countries, the risk of
introduction into EU MS countries was estimated using the MINTRISK model (section above), where
the risk of introduction of a RVFV vector species into a specific MS was estimated considering
separately the frequency of passive movement of vectors (air and sea transportation; road
transportation was not considered due to the low number of lorries driven from RVFV endemic
countries to Europe and lack of data from most of the countries), the probability of survival during the
transport (as a function of transport duration, Annex A.3) and the probability of moving RVFV-infected
vectors. For estimating the frequency of passive transport, data on the number of flights and number
of container shipments for 2016–2018 were considered, combined with the probability of finding a
mosquito in any of those means of transport (Annex 8.1). The prevalence of infected vectors was
estimated according to the references published in the different RVFV endemic countries and reviewed
by Braks et al. (2017). For those countries where references were not available, the prevalence of
infected vectors was extrapolated from those neighbouring countries that share the same species of
vectors.
For the probability of establishment (first and second step of transmission when and if an infected
vector or host is introduced), the climatic situation in each MS has been considered by assigning a
coefficient calculated as the proportion of days above 9.6°C in the 5 years 2013–2018 in each MS.
2.2.2.2. MINTRISK questions and assignment of category values
The part of the MINTRISK model related to risk of introduction is structured in four components,
i.e. worldwide occurrence of the disease, rate of entry, level of transmission and probability of
establishment. For RVF, two pathways have been considered, the animal and vector pathways. For
each component, a set of questions need to be answered with a value chosen from a scale given by
the model and a related level of uncertainty (low, moderate, high). The description of the
methodology used and the reasoning to assign the different values is given below.
Country OIE WHO Air Sea Road
8 Kenya 50 5 Y Y
9 Madagascar 7 5 Y Y
10 Mali 1 1 Y
11 Mauritania 12 14 Y
12 Mayotte (France) 3 1
13 Mozambique 21 Y
14 Namibia 15 Y
15 Niger 1 Y Y
16 Nigeria 4 Y
17 Saudi Arabia 1 Y Y
18 Senegal 5 Y Y
19 South Africa 677 Y Y
20 South Sudan 1
21 Sudan 6 1 Y
22 Uganda 4
23 Rwanda 8 Y
24 Swaziland 2
25 Tanzania 5
26 Yemen*
*: Egypt and Yemen are included since they experienced outbreaks before 2006 but they are endemic countries.
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STEP 0: WORLDWIDE OCCURRENCE
1. What is the relative size of the infected area to the total area addressed?
This aims at estimating the fraction of the animal population (expressed as an area) which is at risk
during the epidemic.
• Reasoning: the area considered is the sum of the area of the affected countries in 2016–2019
(see Section 3.1.2) plus the area of endemic ones (Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia,
Kenya, Mali, Mayotte, Mozambique, Niger, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda,
Rwanda, Nigeria, Egypt, total area 10.09 million square km) divided by area of African
continent (30.37 million square km), which makes 0.33.
• Value set in MINTRISK: > 0.3, very large, for both pathways and all MSs (scale: very small:
< 0.01; small: 0.01–0.03; moderate: 0.03–0.1; large: 0.1–0.3; very large: > 0.3).
• Uncertainty: low.
2. How likely is it that the disease will not be notified to OIE?
This is the probability of no notification, despite an epidemic. In MINTRISK, the values range is very
unlikely: < 0.2 (20%); unlikely: 0.2–0.9; moderate: 0.9–0.99; likely: 0.99–0.999; very likely: > 0.999)
• Value set in MINTRISK: Very unlikely, < 0.2, for both pathways and all MSs, same approach
was taken in (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2017).
• Uncertainty: moderate. There are big areas in the sub-Saharan region without much
information.
3. What is the duration of undetected spread?
• reasoning: As indicated in (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2017), many factors
contribute to the detection of a disease in the short term, such as the surveillance capacities,
how the epidemics develop, if human cases are involved, etc. It was considered that a
reasonable value could be 1–3 months, the same approach was taken as in the (EFSA Panel on
Animal Health and Welfare, 2017).
• Value set in MINTRISK: short (0.1–0.3 year), for both pathways and all MSs (scale: very short:
< 0.1 year; short: 0.1–0.3 year; moderate: 0.3–1 year; long: 1–3 year; very long: > 3 year).
• Uncertainty: moderate.
4. What is the frequency with which the epidemic occurs in the addressed area?
• reasoning: see the number of epidemics per year in Africa (Section 3.1.2)
• value set in MINTRISK: moderate, 0.3–1 per year, for both pathways and all MSs (scale: very
low: < 0.1 per year; low: 0.1–0.3 per year; moderate: 0.3–1 per year; high: 1–3 per year;
very high: > 3 per year).
• Uncertainty: low.
5. How high is the prevalence of the infection in host animals or vectors in the region in
the end of HRP of an epidemic in that region?
• MINTRISK scale: very low: < 1E-4; low: 1E-4 - 0.001; moderate: 0.001–0.01; high: 0.01–0.1;
very high: > 0.1.
• Animal pathway: number of cases/susceptible in 2016–2019, considering the number of
cases/susceptible as from outbreak data from OIE in the period 2016–2019; this would be 1E-4
- 0.001, thus ‘low’ in MINTRISK; uncertainty: low.
• Vector pathway: based on the review by Tantely et al. (2015), mean value of 53 values
reported in different countries and in different species, mean: 67% with SD 29.74, would be in
the category very high, including filed and laboratory trials on vector competence; while,
according to a literature review presented in Braks et al. 2017, the average minimum infection
rate in RVF vectors is 3.54% (SD 8.14) considering only field data, falling in the MINTRISK
category high, uncertainty: moderate. For this assessment, the value of prevalence from field
data is considered as the most appropriate.
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STEP 1: RATE OF ENTRY
6. What are the average numbers /volumes of animals/vectors/commodities moved
along the pathway per year?
• Scale: (minimal: < 100; minor: 100–103; moderate: 103–104; major: 104–105; massive: > 105)
• Animal pathway: the category of the MINTRISK is assumed to be ‘minimal’, see
Section 3.2.1.1, for all MS.
o Uncertainty: low.
• Vector pathway: number of mosquitoes moved per maritime transport and flights per year
from African countries towards MS, see Vectornet report and Annex A.3.
o Uncertainty: to assign the uncertainty category for Mintrisk see Annex A.1.
7. What is the probability of passing through the preventive/control measures before/at
transport? (very low: < 0.001; low: 0.001–0.01; moderate: 0.01–0.1; high: 0.1–0.8; very high:
> 0.8)
This is the probability (P) of being removed from import due to risk prevention measures, such as
testing and quarantine for animals or insecticide treatment for vectors.
• Animal pathway: as in (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2017):
o SE: -Sensitivity_diagTest2: 93%
o D1: Duration kept on the holding before dispatch (days): 40
o D2: Duration of quarantine at border (days): 30
o Det1: Median of first detection of virus (days): 1
o Det2-Median of last detection of virus (days) : 2
o IP: Infectious period of the host:1
P = 1Se*EXP((D1 + D2)/(Det1 + Det2)
o for all MS: <0.001, very low
o Uncertainty: low
• Vector pathway: controlled trials about the efficacy of treatment in flights showed 100%
efficacy (Russell and Paton, 1989). However, there is little information about the efficacy of
disinsection in real conditions, despite it being highly recommended by (WHO, 2012, 2018) and
(International Air Transport, 2018). Aspects such as resistance to insecticides are also of
importance, since intercepted Ae. aegypti mosquitoes detected at international ports in New
Zealand and Australia had point mutations that confer resistance to synthetic pyrethroids
(Ammar et al., 2019). In general, there is no consensus among authors in regard to the efficacy
of disinsection conducted in airplanes to avoid the entry of transported mosquitoes, since it
would depend on the countries whether or not air travel companies require the application of the
insecticide treatment, and furthermore, there are different legislations in terms of the type of
products (Gratz et al., 2000; Grout, 2015; Mier-y-Teran-Romero et al., 2017). For example,
Scholte et al. (2008) considered that since no mosquitoes were found in those companies that
used insecticides, the control method could be considered as effective. Similarly, Lounibos
(2002) considered that insecticide applications, either on the ground or in-flight, are effective
based on the works from Russell & Paton (1989), but admits that systematic disinsection is rare
and therefore not avoiding the establishment of the majority of vectors arriving on airplanes. On
the contrary, Brown et al. (2012) considered that despite the effort on airplane disinsection, it
would not be sufficient to avoid the risk of mosquitoes from entering the United Kingdom, since
for example Culex mosquitoes are frequently in the cargo hold where traditional disinsection is
usually not conducted or can be less efficacious (Whelan et al., 2012).
• Thus, according to the information currently available, the probability for vectors to be
controlled before or at transport can be considered as ‘moderate’, with high uncertainty.
8. What is the probability that a viable VBD-agent is still present upon arrival in the area
at risk?
This is the probability of survival of the infection (P2), given the mode and duration of transport.
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• Animal pathway:
o EXP(-duration of journey/(median first detection + infectious period))
o duration of infection: min = 1 day and max = 3 days
o duration of journey: min = 1 day and max = 5 days
o P2 (mean) = 0.301 (CI: 0.124; 0.536)
o MINTRISK range: low (0.1–0.8)
o Uncertainty: low
• Vector pathway:
o RVFV is viable in a surviving vector and the survival of mosquitoes depends on the length of
trip at sea (4–15 days).5 This is weighted for flights where the survival is always very high
compared to sea transport per each MS. See calculation in Annex A.2.
o Uncertainty: in order to assign the uncertainty category for MINTRISK:
X = (Upper CI_Value – LowerCI_Value)/(2 9 Value),
then: X < = 0.1 –> Low; 0.1 < X < = 0.3 –> Moderate; 0.3 < X –> High
STEP 2: LEVEL OF TRANSMISSION
9. What is the distribution of the vector in the area at risk?
• Categories in MINTRISK: absent; present, absent or unknown.
• Value set: present for all MSs (Wint et al., 2020).
• Uncertainty: low.
10. What is the estimated value of the basic reproduction ratio?
• Scale in MINTRISK: very low: < 0.3; low: 0.3–1;moderate: 1–3; high: 3–10 very high: > 10.
• The estimated value ranges between 2.3 and 6.8 (which corresponds to moderate to
high in MINTRISK), with uncertainty category ‘moderate’ (Braks et al., 2017).
11. Which fraction of the host population is susceptible (i.e. not protected from infection
by routine vaccination or previous exposure)?
• Scale in MINTRISK: very low: < 0.03; low: 0.03–0.1; moderate: 0.1–0.3; high: 0.3–0.8;
very high: > 0.8.
• Reasoning and value: 100% RVF host animals in EU would be susceptible to RVF.
• Uncertainty: low.
STEP 3: probability of establishment
12. What is the probability of infecting a first local (indigenous) vector or host, given the
pathway of entry and the expected region and time of entry? [1st transmission step]
o Scale in MINTRISK: very low: < 1E-4; low: 1E-4 - 0.001; moderate: 0.001–0.01; high: 0.01–
0.1; very high: > 0.1.
o Reasoning: given one infected vector or infected host enters, the probability of the first
transmission step would depend on the chance of finding the respective susceptible host or
vector, besides the sufficiently high temperature for the vector activity. The host density has
been estimated by the number of ruminants in relation to the MS area; for the vector
presence, the proportion of each MS with competent RVFV vectors has been considered (Wint
et al., 2020); for the temperature, a coefficient based on the proportion of days above 9.6°C
in the years 2013–2018 per each MS has been calculated. The probability for the first
transmission step when an infected vector would enter has been calculated as the geometric
mean of host density and temperature coefficient; while the probability for the first
transmission step when an infected host would enter has been calculated as the geometric
mean of vector presence and temperature coefficient. The categories for MINTRISK have been
assigned according to 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th percentiles of the distribution of the geometric
mean (see Annex A.3).
o Uncertainty: low.
5 Transovarial transmission is not considered; see Section 3.1.3.3.
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13. What is the probability of infecting a first local vector (given first infection of an
indigenous host) or host (given first infection of an indigenous vector)? [2nd
transmission step]:
o Scale in MINTRISK: very low: < 0.001; low: 0.001–0.01; moderate: 0.01–0.1; high: 0.1–0.8;
very high: > 0.8.
o Reasoning: the probability of the second transmission step would depend on the chance of
finding at the same time a susceptible host and vector and the seasonality for the vector activity.
The same approach as for point 12 has been used, but the three values have been combined,
the geometric mean of the three values (host density, vector presence and seasonality) has been
computed and five categories for MINTRISK assigned according to 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th
percentiles of the distribution of the geometric mean. (Annex A.3).
o Uncertainty: low.
3. Assessment
3.1. Global epidemiological situation in relation to RVF
In this section, the most relevant information on RVF is summarised about the characteristics of the
virus, the spatial and temporal distribution of RVFV and the evolution of the disease by focusing on its
expansion towards Europe, diagnostic tools and vaccines.
3.1.1. Disease agent
Rift valley fever virus (RVFV) belongs to the genus Phlebovirus, family Bunyaviridae even though
recently proposed to be reallocated to the family Phenuiviridae (Maes et al., 2018). The virion has an
icosahedral symmetry with a host cell-derived bilipid-layer envelope through which virus-coded
glycoprotein spikes project. The viral genome is composed of three RNA segments, L (large), M
(medium) and S (small), of negative or ambisense polarity, each of them contained in a separate
nucleocapsid within the virion (Coetzer and Tustin, 2005). The genome segments encode four structural
proteins: the viral polymerase (L) on the L segment, two glycoproteins (Gn and Gc) on the M segment,
and the viral nucleocapsid protein (N) on the S segment (Struthers et al., 1984). RVFV Gn and Gc
glycoproteins being exposed on the outer surface of the virus during infection (Huiskonen et al., 2009),
are recognised by the host immune system and induce the production of neutralising antibodies.
Together with the N protein, they elicit the production of RVFV-specific RVFV IgG and IgM antibodies
after infection. RVFV virus additionally expresses two non-structural proteins, NSm1 and NSm2,
encoded on the M segment and NSs on the S segment (Gerrard and Nichol, 2007). These non-structural
proteins play important roles for pathogenesis (Vialat et al., 2000; Won et al., 2006; Gerrard et al.,
2007; Bird et al., 2008). Transcription and replication take place in the cell cytoplasm.
RVFV consists of a single serotype with a limited genomic variability among the circulating strains
(Bird et al., 2008).
RVFV survives in the freeze-dried form and in aerosols at 23°C under 50–85% of humidity, with
25% of the initial infectivity being retained at 1 h. The virus can be maintained several years through
the egg stage of some arthropod vector species belonging specifically to the Aedes genus during inter-
epidemic periods (lasting till 5–15 years). It can survive contact with 0.5% phenol at 4°C for 6 months
(OIE, 2009).
Heat and low pH (< 6) inactivate the RVFV as is the case with lipid solvents, detergents and
disinfectants. Infectivity is maintained in protein-rich medium (e.g. plasma or serum) for up to 20 h at
‘room temperature’ (conventionally 22°C), 8 months at 4–5°C and 8 years under a variety of
(unspecified) conditions of refrigeration. Infectivity survives heating to 56°C for up to 3 h, RVFV is
most stable at pH 7.0–7.8, labile at pH < 6.8 or > 8.0, sensitive to ether and bile salts, destroyed by
low concentrations of formalin, or by methylene blue in the presence of light (EFSA, 2005).
Key message:
• RVFV consists of a single serotype of the genus Phlebovirus with a limited genomic variability
among the circulating strains.
• The virus is readily inactivated by lipid solvents and acid conditions (pH < 6).
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3.1.2. Spatial and temporal distribution of RVF
3.1.2.1. Worldwide distribution
Since 2006 to the present (2019), RVF spread in livestock in southern Africa, East Africa and Saudi
Arabia, then outbreaks were reported in West Africa in 2010–2012 with even human cases
(Mauritania). More recently, it was reported in East Africa in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Tanzania, and
in 2018–2019, a broad epidemic was reported in Mayotte (France). The spatial and temporal
distribution of the reported RVF outbreaks in animal and human populations from 2006 to October
2019 is shown in Figure 2 and in the movie map at this link https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3688061.
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Figure 2: Temporal distribution of reported RVF outbreaks in animals and humans from 2006 to
October 2019 (OIE and WHO data)
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Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of years of reported presence of RVF (see also Table 2),
together with the different animal species and human outbreaks.
Figure 3: Number of years of reported presence of RVF and species affected in the outbreaks
reported between 2006 and 2019 (OIE and WHO)
Table 2: Countries where and years when RVF outbreaks were officially notified either to the OIE
and ADNS for animals or to WHO for humans, since 2000 (Sources: OIE and ADNS for
animal data; WHO for human data6).
Country
Years of notification
TOTALOutbreaks in Animals
(OIE and ADNS)
Outbreaks in humans
(WHO)
Botswana 2010/2014/2017 2010/2014/2017
Central African
Republic
2019 2019
Chad 2018 2018
Comoros 2008/2009/2010/2011 2008/2009/2010/2011
Democratic
Republic
of Congo
2012 2012
Egypt 2003 2003
Republic of
Guinea
2006 2006
Gambia 2002/2018 2002/2018
6 https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2019/en/ and https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/disease/rift_valley_fever/en/; https://
www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/rift-valley-fever
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The occurrence of major RVF epidemics has been historically considered to be linked to climatic
conditions like the occurrence of the warm phase of the El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO)
phenomenon causing floods, increased greenness of vegetation index and emergence of mosquito
vectors infecting susceptible ruminant hosts (Nanyingi et al., 2015). This would explain the multi-
annual cyclic appearance of the disease in some areas of Africa, such as southern Africa and sub-
Saharan Africa like in Kenya or in Mauritania. Nevertheless, in the last decade, RVF epidemics have
been occurring more frequently in West Africa and in other sub-Saharan countries. This may be linked
to some low-level circulation of RVFV in livestock (undetected but present and circulating), which has
been observed in various countries (Rissmann et al., 2017; Clark et al., 2018).
The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, USA), taking into consideration historical
information on human and animal cases as well as the detection of RVF antibodies with different
serological tests, have classified the countries according to the epidemiological situation on RVF in
three classes (endemic, sporadic presence, unknown status) as it is presented in Figure 4.
Country
Years of notification
TOTALOutbreaks in Animals
(OIE and ADNS)
Outbreaks in humans
(WHO)
Kenya 2006/2007/2018/2019 2006/2007/2014/2015/
2018
2006/2007/2014/2015/2018/2019
Madagascar 2008/2009 2008/2009 2008/2009
Mali 2016/2017 2016/2017
Mauritania 2006/2010/2011/2012/2013/
2014/2015
2010/2012 2006/2010/2011/2012/2013/2014/
2015
Mayotte
(France)
2008/2018/2019 2019 2008/2018/2019
Mozambique 2007/2013/2014/2016/2018 2007/2013/2014/2016/2018
Namibia 2010/2011/2012 2010/2011/2012
Niger 2016 2016 2016
Nigeria 2017 2017
Rwanda 2012/2013/2014/2016/2017/
2018
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From Figure 4, the most important areas at risk of representing a possible front of expansion of
RVF towards Europe are Arabic Peninsula and the Middle East.
3.1.2.2. Mayotte
The Mayotte Department is a part of the French Territory belonging to the EU Territory (i.e. where
EU regulations apply); therefore, French Veterinary Authorities are obliged to notify the RVF outbreaks8
to the EU Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS),9 according to the Council Directive 82/894/
EEC.10 The data on ADNS include only the outbreaks that have been officially confirmed and notified
by the Veterinary Authorities. An outbreak can referred to more than one affected animal even in
different species if they constitute a unique epidemiological unit and are identified at the same
location. Up until the end of October 2019, 125 outbreaks were reported in Mayotte in ruminants
(cattle, sheep, goats) (Figure 5).
Figure 4: Amended map of CDC classification of the countries where RVF has been confirmed: (i)
blue: countries reporting endemic disease and substantial outbreaks of RVF; (ii) green:
countries reporting few cases, periodic isolation of virus, or serological evidence of RVF;
and (iii) grey: RVF status unknown or not reported. (source: CDC7)
7 downloaded on 7/10/2019; https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/rvf/outbreaks/distribution-map.html
8 Definitions of the terms outbreak and case (article 4 Directive 82/894): ‘outbreak’ means the holding or place situated in the
territory of the Community where animals are assembled and where one or more cases has or have been officially confirmed.
While ‘case’ means the official confirmation of any of the diseases listed in Annex I of the Directive 82/894 in any animal or
carcass.
9 ADNS, the EU Animal Disease Notification System, see http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-diseases/not-system_en
10 Council Directive 82/894/EEC of 21 December 1982 on the notification of animal diseases within the Community http://data.
europa.eu/eli/dir/1982/894/oj
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3.1.2.3. RVF seropositivity in countries officially RVF free
The results of some recently published studies, carried out in the countries surrounding the
Mediterranean Basin, which never reported the disease either in humans or in animals, indicate the
presence of a certain level of seropositivity in animals and in humans in some areas. These countries
are: Turkey (Gur et al., 2017; Yilmaz et al., 2017), Tunisia (Bosworth et al., 2016), Iran (Fakour et al.,
2017), Iraq (Muhsen, 2012; Saleh Aghaa and Rhaymah, 2013), Algeria (Nardo et al., 2014) and
Western Sahara (El-Harrak et al., 2011; Nardo et al., 2014). In most of these studies, the sample size
was limited, and the areas of study were limited. In many cases, details about the origin of animals
tested are lacking, thus hampering a proper evaluation of the outcomes. Table 3 presents the results
of the most recent studies published. In addition, the map in Figure 6 shows the geographical areas
where seropositive results were observed.
Figure 5: RVF reported outbreaks in Mayotte in 2018 and 2019 in ruminants (cattle, sheep, goats) as
notified to the ADNS and provided by the French Veterinary Authorities
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Table 3: Publications indicating seropositivity in humans and/or animals in countries where RVF has
never officially been reported either in animals or humans
Country
Sampling
Period
Region,
Province,
Area
Species
No
samples
Lab. Tests Results Publications
Iran January to
December
2016
Kurdistan
Province
cattle 118 C-ELISA,
IFA
1.7 % positive Fakour et al.
(2017)goats 28 negative
sheep 142 2.11 % positive
Iraq Unknown,
before 2012
Basrah sheep 1,215 ELISA (OIE) 8.88 % positive Muhsen (2012)
October 2012
to February
2013
Nineveh
Province
sheep 184 C-ELISA 1.08 % positive Saleh Aghaa and
Rhaymah (2013)goats 184 4.89 % positive
South
West
Algeria
March to April
2008
Refugee camps
wilayas in
Tindouf
province
and
Dakhla
Bir Lehlou
Tifariti
Mehaires
sheep 461 C-ELISA 1.12% positive
IgG
Nardo et al.
(2014)
North
East
Western
Sahara
goats 463
camels 58
Western
Sahara
2009 Dakhla
Smara–
Laayoune
camels 100 C-ELISA, VN 15% positive El-Harrak et al.
(2011)
Morocco Tata negative
Tunisia summer 2014 Sousse
Mahdia
Sfax
humans 219 qRT-PCR negative Bosworth et al.
(2016)indirect
immunofluorescence
testing kits
1.37 % IgG
positive
6.84 % IgM
positive
Turkey May 2013 to
November
2016
Province of
Istanbul
children 110 RT-PCR negative Yilmaz et al.
(2017)
(conference
proceeding),
presentation of
the conference
provided by
Husein Yilmaz,
and personal
communication
with Husein
Yilmaz
Indirect IgG ELISA 3.64 % positive
WB 6.3% positive
Provinces of
Edirne,
Kırklareli,
Tekirdag in
Marmara
Region
cattle 200 RT-PCR negative
Indirect IgG ELISA 4.5 % positive
WB 5.55 % positive
sheep 160 RT-PCR negative
Indirect IgG ELISA 3.75 % positive
WB 5.6 % positive
2009–2012 Aydin Province camels 72 C-ELISA 1.3 % positive Gur et al.
(2017)July to August
2005
Sanlıurfa
Province
gazelles 82 negative
October 1999
to 2001
Afyon Province
Amasya
Province
Samsun
Province
Ankara
Province
water
buffalos
352 9.94% positive
Sivas Province
Tokat Province
Konya Province
Elazıg Province
58 negative
Rift Valley Fever
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 23 EFSA Journal 2020;18(3):6041
On 15 January 2020, two RVF outbreaks have been notified to the OIE by the veterinary authority of
Libya. The start of the event was reported as 12 December 2019. The two outbreaks are located in the
south-eastern region of Al Kufrah, city of Aljouf, around 200 km and 300 km from the borders with Egypt
and Sudan, respectively. In each outbreak (one with sheep and the other with sheep and goat animals),
only one case has been declared. No deaths are reported. In the epidemiological comments section of
the immediate notification, the following explanation is reported: ‘As a part of surveillance carried out for
Rift Valley fever in the whole country under the Food and Agriculture Organization project No.OSRO.LIB
801.CHA. around 150 samples from sheep and goat farms were collected by risk-based surveillance
teams in Alkufra. Two samples from the Aljouf area gave a positive result’. Given this explanation,
referring to serological positivity alone in the outbreaks, and the lack of major information about the
origin of positive animals and the possible presence of clinical signs in the farms, it is difficult to provide
any epidemiological evaluation about these two notified outbreaks. It is important to remember,
however, that in the same period (end of 2019) a large RVF epidemic was notified in Sudan.
Key messages:
• RVF is historically present in sub-Saharan areas and in specific zones of the Arabian Peninsula,
across the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
• In the last two decades, more evidence has been obtained on the spread of RVFV to new
African areas, not known as infected before, even in those areas considered not optimal for
mosquito-borne diseases, like the pre-desertic areas of Sahel.
• Historically, major RVF epidemics have been cyclically observed in endemic areas, with long
inter-epizootic periods (5–15 years) during which the virus was not detected in animal
populations. In the last decade, RVF epidemics have been recorded more frequently and low-
level enzootic RVFV circulation in livestock has been demonstrated in various areas.
Figure 6: Countries (Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia and Western Sahara), where RVF seropositive
results have been detected, with data available through publications or reports
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• Outbreaks in a French overseas department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey and
Tunisia raised concern with the EU for a possible incursion into countries neighbouring the EU.
• Positive serological findings in Algeria, Western Sahara, Tunisia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, which are
countries considered officially free from RVF, must be carefully interpreted on the bases of the
study designs and diagnostic tests used. However, the detection of serological positive
individuals (animals or humans) in these countries must be seen as a potential risk of RVF
spread out of its endemic geographical area.
3.1.3. Transmission and host range
3.1.3.1. Animal hosts
RVF affects domestic and wild ruminants and camels (FAO, 2003).
Camels
Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are susceptible to RVFV and infections have been
recorded in most sub-Saharan African countries, with serological prevalence values ranging from 3.0 to
51.9 percent depending on the sampling period, strategy and location (Miguel et al., 2016).
Widespread abortion waves associated with positive serologic test results were observed in dromedary
populations during RVF outbreaks in Kenya and Egypt (Mroz et al 2017). During the 2010 outbreak in
Mauritania, two clinical forms were observed in camels: (i) a peracute form with sudden death within
24 hours; and (ii) an acute form with fever, various systemic lesions and abortions. When
haemorrhagic signs developed, death usually occurred within a few days (El Mamy et al., 2011).
However, mild forms and even a virus carrier state without clinical signs were also described. For
instance, RVFV was isolated from blood samples from healthy, naturally infected dromedary camels in
Egypt and Sudan (Eisa, 1984; Imam et al., 1979) while experimental infections did not induce clinical
signs in non-pregnant dromedaries (Davies et al., 1985).
The potential role of dromedaries as amplifying hosts or virus spreaders remains unclear.
Dromedaries may have brought the virus from north Sudan to south Egypt, where it caused the first
Egyptian outbreak in 1977 (Eisa, 1984). A second study showed that RVFV was still circulating in
dromedaries in Mauritania when the epidemic was officially declared over (El Mamy et al., 2014). In
some areas, they may act as an amplifying host but do not seem to be essential to the epidemiological
cycle of RVFV and its maintenance in all ecosystems. Viral circulation and/or large outbreaks have been
reported in ‘camel-free’ countries such as Madagascar or countries in Central and Southern Africa,
although the presence of various cycles in specific socio-ecosystems cannot be ruled out. From a
zoonotic point of view, it is well known that transmission from cattle/small ruminants to humans occurs
via direct contact with viraemic blood or infectious abortion products, but there is as yet no specific
information about transmission from dromedary camels to humans (Miguel et al., 2016).
Wildlife
Although the exact epidemiological role of African buffaloes (Syncerus caffer) and other wild native
or endemic ruminants for RVF is still not completely understood, they could contribute to the spread of
the disease in eastern Africa as noted by several authors (Davies and Karstad, 1981; Anderson and
Rowe, 1998; Evans et al., 2008; LaBeaud et al., 2011; Olive et al., 2012).
A recent experimental survey showed that white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), in North
America, can transmit the virus through direct contact (n = 1) presumptively by the faecal–oral route
(Wilson et al., 2018) : this result raises many questions about the potential role of wildlife in endemic
areas, but also in Europe in case of introduction. There is Serological and sometimes virological
evidence of an association between wild rodents and RVFV, but their involvement in the
epidemiological cycle remains unclear (Olive et al., 2012).
Seventy-two lemurs were sampled and tested for RVFV during an interepidemic period in Mayotte
by Metras et al. (2017) and showed no evidence of RVFV genome or antibodies in the samples (Metras
et al., 2017).
Bats: several published studies of virus isolation, molecular evidence or seroconversion in bats have
been published (Balkema-Buschmann et al., 2018; Kading et al., 2018; Nyakarahuka et al., 2018).
However, whether or not bats serve as a reservoir of RVFV during interepidemic periods remains to be
determined (Fagre and Kading, 2019).
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3.1.3.2. Humans
Humans infected with RVFV mostly develop subclinical or relatively mild forms, showing only
influenza-like clinical signs (CDC, 2013). A small proportion of infected people can develop more severe
symptoms such as ocular disease, encephalitis and/or haemorrhagic fever, which can be fatal.
3.1.3.3. Vectors
RVFV has been isolated from field samples of more than 47 species of mosquitoes, including
species in eight genera within the family Culicidae, where Aedes and Culex genera are considered to
be the main vectors (EFSA, 2013; Linthicum et al., 2016; Lumley et al., 2017).
Transmission cycles are showed in Figure 7.
According to the previous EFSA Opinion on RVFV (EFSA, 2013), in general Rift Valley fever has
been reported in four ecological systems: (i) dambo areas (African shallow wetlands), (ii) semi-arid
areas, (iii) irrigated areas and (iv) temperate and mountainous areas. Typical endemic circulation of
the virus in the dambo areas has been related to vertical transmission in the vector (adult to egg) and
minimal amplification by vertebrates. Vertical transmission (VT) is hypothesised to allow the virus to
persist during inter-epidemic and overwintering periods. However, up to now, it has been
demonstrated only for two species (Ae. mcintoshi in Linthicum et al., 1985, originally reported as Ae.
lineatopennis), and Aedes vexans (Mohamed et al., 2013) and no general evidence is available for
other mosquito species or outbreaks elsewhere in Africa. Therefore, despite widely accepted, VT still
remains generally undetected in most of the RVFV outbreaks recorded during the last 20 years and
consequently, its role in maintaining the virus is uncertain (Lumley et al. 2017).
Epidemic transmission of RVFV has been related to heavy and prolonged rainfall mainly due to
ENSO. In areas such as the dambo-type, it is known to occur every 5–15 years, where, according to
the hypothesis of RVFV-infected Aedes eggs, these dormant eggs hatch and primary vectors Aedes
adults transmit the virus to amplifying vertebrates (domestic ungulates) that trigger the epidemic
cycle. High abundance of secondary vectors appears when stagnant floodwaters are colonised by
Culex and Mansonia species that increase transmission to domestic animals and humans.
Similarly, outbreaks in semi-arid areas are characterised by the existence of temporary water
points, and by permanent waterbodies that favour Culex populations breeding in irrigated areas,
which, in temperate and mountainous areas, are also favoured by local vectors associated with specific
cattle trade practices.
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Key messages:
• RVFV transmission is driven by several species of mosquitoes. Species belonging to Aedes and
Culex genera are the most relevant for enzootic and epizootic cycles, respectively.
• Epizootic transmission is favoured by particular climatic conditions, such as heavy rains.
• Vertical transmission of the virus has been described in species of vectors, however, its role for
explaining the survival of the virus during inter-epizootic periods remains unclear.
Figure 7: Cycle of transmission of the Rift Valley Fever virus. Vectors (mainly Aedes and Culex spp.)
are able to transmit the virus to domestic and wild animals, as well as humans. Direct
transmission is possible among animals and from animals to humans. Vertical transmission
has been described in animals and vectors. The role of vertical transmission for maintaining
the virus during inter-epizootic periods is still under discussion (modified from Balenghien
et al., 2013)
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3.1.4. Laboratory diagnosis of RVF
There are several methods to diagnose acute RVFV infection in livestock and humans, either for
virus detection or for antibody detection, but all must be carried out in laboratory settings.
3.1.4.1. Virus detection
The most appropriate matrix to isolate or detect RVFV is either whole blood or serum samples
collected during the acute (febrile) stage of the disease or different organs collected post-mortem from
fresh carcasses or aborted fetuses such as brain, liver and spleen. RVFV can also be detected in milk,
although tests are not specifically designed for this material (unpublished results from COOPADEM,
farmer association in Mayotte).
Isolation of RVFV can be obtained from (i) inoculation of suckling mice or (ii) inoculations of various
susceptible mammalian or invertebrate cell cultures (OIE, 2018). A cytopathic effect is usually
observed within 5 days from the day of inoculation, the presence of RVFV being confirmed by
immunostaining. However, a faster and safer diagnosis can be achieved through molecular methods
using real-time reverse transcriptase (RT)-polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to detect viral RNA (OIE,
2018) thus minimisng the handling of infectious viruses. Different highly sensitive molecular tests have
been developed for RVFV including nested RT-PCR methods (Sall et al., 2002), quantitative real-time
PCR (Garcia et al., 2001; Drosten et al., 2002; Bird et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2013), multiplex PCR-
based microarray assay (Venter et al., 2014), RT Loop-mediated isothermal amplification (RT-LAMP)
(Le Roux et al., 2009) and recombinase polymerase amplification (RPA) (Euler et al., 2012). Molecular
assays have also been used for the early detection of RVFV RNA in mosquito pools during surveillance
activities (Jupp et al., 2002; LaBeaud et al., 2011). Point of care diagnostic tests have been developed
in the past for the detection of RVF in mosquitoes (Turell et al., 2011; Wanja et al., 2011). More
recently, a pen-side test for RVFV detection in the host compartment was developed through a lateral
flow test (LFT) able to detect viraemic animals in the case of ongoing outbreaks which is likely to help
to better manage the early diagnosis and control of RVF (Cetre-Sossah et al., 2019) with a level of
DSe of 100% (CI 95%[90,1; 100]) (n = 35) and DSp of 98.8% (CI 95% [95.8; 99,7], n = 169). Lastly,
other suitable tests for confirmation of clinical cases include histopathology followed by
immunochemistry (Odendaal et al., 2014) and antigen detection ELISA (OIE, 2018).
3.1.4.2. Antibody detection
Serum samples collected from animals for serological testing need appropriate inactivation steps
such as a combination of heat and chemical inactivation (van Vuren and Paweska, 2010). RVF
antibodies can also be detected in milk, although tests are not specifically designed for this material
(unpublished results from COOPADEM, farmer association in Mayotte).
Viral neutralisation tests (VNTs) and ELISA are suitable tests to detect the host induced immune
response, immune status of individual pre- and post-vaccinated animals, identification of prevalence of
infection and individual animal freedom from infection prior to movement (OIE, 2018).
The VNT remains the reference standard for detecting previous exposure to RVFV but while it is
very specific, sensitive and useful to test samples from any host species of interest it is also costly,
time consuming, and requires a high biosecurity laboratory capable of working safely with live RVFV.
One method of diagnosing acute or very recent infection is to use ELISA detecting IgM towards
RVFV antigens (Williams et al., 2011) since IgG-based ELISA cannot distinguish between past and
acute RVFV infections. Commercial assays kits are available as well as several in-house protocols have
been published (van Vuren and Paweska, 2010; Fafetine et al., 2012); the performance of some of
them has been compared in ring trials assays (Kortekaas et al., 2013). Sensitivity and specificity differ
according to the antigens and protocols used (whole virus or recombinant proteins), and species
investigated (domestic vs. wildlife species) (Paweska et al., 2005, 2008; Evans et al., 2008; Lubisi
et al., 2019) (Table 4). An indirect ELISA based on the recombinant nucleocapsid protein of RVFV has
been developed to differentiate between infected and clone 13-vaccinated animals (DIVA). In naturally
infected animals, antibodies against both N and NSs would be detected, otherwise in individuals
vaccinated with the clone 13 live-attenuated vaccines lacking NSs only an antibody response to the N
protein would be observed (McElroy et al., 2009).
Alternative techniques such as the indirect immunofluorescence, agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID),
radio-immunoassays and complement fixation are no longer used (OIE, 2018).
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Table 4: Details of the commercially available (*) or in-house developed ELISA tests
Name
(manufacturer)
Format Antigen Tested species Validation data References
ID Screen® Rift
Valley Fever
Competition Multi-
species (ID Vet)*
Competitive Np rec
(E. coli)
Multiple species,
including
ruminants, camels,
horses, dogs and
others
Sp%: 100 (CI 95%:
99.58–100%),
n = 920
(bovine, ovine,
caprine, horses,
dogs, cats, human)
Se%: 100 (CI 95%:
91.24–100%),
n = 40
(bovine from
Djibouti and
Mayotte collected in
2008; 18 tested in
VN)
El Mamy et al.
(2011) and
Comtet et al.
(2010)
ID Screen® Rift
Valley Fever IgM
Capture (ID Vet)*
IgM capture Np rec Domestic ruminants
(Anti-bovine-ovine-
caprine IgM
antibody)
Springbok
(Antidorcas
marsupialis)
Not provided by
manufacturer
RVF recN IgG
Indirect ELISA
(BDSL)**
Indirect Np rec
(E. coli)
Human and
livestock
Jansen van
Vuren et al.
(2007)
RVF Inhibition
ELISA (BDSL)**
Inhibition RVFV inac Human, domestic
ruminants, buffalo,
camel
Sp%: 99.47
(humans), 99.52
(cattle), 99.65
(goats), 99.29
(sheep), 99.51
(buffaloes), 100
(camels)
Se%: 99.47
(humans), 100
(cattle), 99.56
(goats), 100
(sheep), 100
(buffalo), 100
(camel)
Paweska et al.
(2005)
RVF IgM ELISA
(BDSL)**
IgM capture RVFV inac Domestic ruminants Sp%: 98.7(sheep)
99.7 (goats)
100 (cattle)
Paweska et al.
(2003)
INgezim FVR
Compact R.13
FVR.K3
(Ingenasa)*
Competitive Np rec Domestic ruminants Sp%:99 (n. 1526
cattle, sheep,
goats) (n.1014
deer, ibex,
mouflons, fallow
deer, alpacas and
zebra)
Se%:97 (31 sheep
experimentally
infected)
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Name
(manufacturer)
Format Antigen Tested species Validation data References
INgezim FVR IgM
R.13.FVR.K2-
(Ingenasa)*
IgM capture Np rec Domestic ruminants Sp%: 99.3
Se%: 95.7
1589 ovine, caprine
and bovine sera
(experimentally
infected and
vaccinated animals.
The negative
samples
corresponded to
different RVFV-free
areas in Spain)
Indirect Np rec
(baculovirus)
Sheep, cattle Sp%: 97 (sheep) to
100 (cattle)
Se%: 100 (vs.
PRNT in sheep and
cattle
experimentally
infected)
Faburay et al.
(2019)
Indirect Gn rec
(E. coli)
Small ruminants Sp%: 95.6
Se%: 94.6
(n. 1952 sheep and
goat sera from
Mozambique,
Senegal, Uganda
and Yemen)
J€ackel et al.
(2013)
Double Ag ELISA
(IgM and IgG
detection)
Refer to
William
(2011)
Cattle and sheep Sp%: 100
Se%: 98.4
(412 sheep and
121 cattle)
Ellis et al.
(2014)
IgM capture Np rec
(E. coli)
Small ruminants
and cattle
– Williams et al.
(2011)
Competitive Np rec
(E. coli/ Mab)
Cattle and goat Sp%: 99.7
Se%: 94.7
(n. 105 blood
samples collected
at intervals from
experimental
infection of 2 cattle
and 5 goats)
Kim et al.
(2012)
Indirect Np rec + NSs
rec
Human, goats – McElroy et al.
(2009)
Indirect with IgG
and IgM
conjugates
Np rec
(E. coli)
Sheep, goat, cattle Sp%: 99.5–100
(goats), 100
(sheep), 98.3
(cattle)
Se%: 99.4–100
(goats), 100
(sheep), 100
(cattle)
Fafetine et al.
(2007)
*: Np rec, recombinant nucleocapsid protein; Gn rec, recombinant glycoprotein Gn; NSs rec, recombinant Non-structural proteins.
**: Not commercially available at the present.
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3.1.4.3. Level of capability in the EU and Mediterranean
Diagnostic capability among EU Member countries and in the Mediterranean region has been
assessed recently through European proficiency testing. A first proficiency testing involving six
laboratories representing five EU countries (The Netherlands, France, Germany, Spain and UK) with
some of them being national reference laboratories for RVF provided evidence of the proficiency of the
participating laboratories (Kortekaas et al., 2013).
A broader proficiency test has been completed in 2014 including 11 laboratories from seven
different countries within the REMESA network: three laboratories from Algeria, two from France, one
from Mauritania, two from Morocco, one from Spain, one from Tunisia and one from Italy. Both RVFV
genome and antibody detection were included in the external quality assessment in order to evaluate
the diagnostic capacities and monitor the quality of the activities. CIRAD also performed a ring test in
Mali and Senegal with satisfying results.
While six laboratories participated in both the viral genome detection by RT-PCR and the specific
IgG and IgM antibodies detection trials, four laboratories participated exclusively in the antibody
detection trial. Besides some limited misidentification of the samples, the two proficiency tests
mentioned above provided evidence that most of the participating laboratories were capable to detect
RVF antibodies and viral RNA thus recognising RVF infection in affected ruminants with the diagnostic
methods currently available (Monaco et al., 2015). RVF diagnostic tests are in place in most of the
other Mediterranean countries, nevertheless an evaluation of their performances should be encouraged
through proficiency testing.
Key messages:
• Molecular assays to detect RVFV are available (gel-based and RT-PCR) and, more recently, a
pen-side test for early detection of viraemic animals has been developed, and may become
available;
• Serological tests to detect RVF antibodies and to distinguish early from past infection of RVF in
domestic ruminants and camelids are available;
• In the EU, the diagnostic capability of the laboratories has been assessed and the level of
performance considered adequate as well as in National Laboratories from Algeria, Mauritania,
Morocco, Tunisia, Mali and Senegal;
• RVF diagnostic tests are in place in most of the other Mediterranean countries; nevertheless,
an evaluation of their performances should be encouraged through inter-laboratory trials.
3.1.5. Possible geographical expansion and areas posing a risk for EU
In the previous EFSA Opinion on RVF (EFSA, 2013), the risk of introduction of RVFV through the
movements of live animals and vectors into non-RVF-infected Middle East and Northern African
(MENA11) countries (namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Territories,
Lebanon and Syria) was already assessed. In that Opinion, the Veterinary Services of the MENA
countries reported that no official trade was in place with RVF-infected countries.
FAOSTAT database12 accessed on September 2019, however, reported limited numbers of live
ruminants and camels officially imported from RVF-infected countries by Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon and
Morocco between 2009 and 2016 (Table 5).
Table 5: Number of animals (camels, cattle, sheep, goats) imported into MENA countries from RVF-
infected countries between 2009 and 2016 (FAOSTAT, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data)
Importing country
Exporting country
Egypt Mauritania Niger Somalia Sudan (former) Total
Algeria 38 1,529 1,567
Jordan 57,437 57,437
Lebanon 3,521 975 4,496
Morocco 21 21
11 https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/MENA
12 http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data
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Although the numbers reported by FAO are modest, they can be considered as a proxy for
unknown trade or not reported animals traded among these countries. It also highlights that data from
Libya and Syria are not available probably due to the ongoing conflicts.
In relation to the possible introduction of RVFV through animal movements, the previous EFSA
Opinion (EFSA, 2013) considered two main sources of infection:
• East source: South and North Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kenya, Tanzania,
• West source: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Conakry, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Mali,
Niger and Chad.
When the main live animal trade routes are considered, however, for the sake of simplicity, three
main pathways can be considered as potential ways to introduce RVFV into non-RVF-infected MENA
countries (Bouslikhane, 2015):
• West Africa routes, including informal trade in live small ruminants and camels from the Sahel
countries (especially Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad) to North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Libya).
• East Africa routes characterised by the movement of live animals between countries in the
Great Lakes region and along the Nile river. The latter, involving mainly South and North
Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt are of special importance for the possibility of RVFV to
reach the Mediterranean coasts.
• Horn of Africa routes, involving the export of live animals from countries of the Region (mainly
South and North Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia) to the Gulf States and Middle East
countries.
Other live animal trade routes may be recognised in northern Africa (Jenet et al., 2016), across the
Sahara Desert, also involving animal exchanges between Maghreb countries (Bouguedour and Ripani,
2016), but the three main routes listed above can be considered as the most important for the
potential introduction of RVFV into MENA countries (Figure 8).
3.1.5.1. West Africa routes
In the Sahel and West Africa, transhuman pastoralism is one of the major livestock production
systems, involving an estimated 70–90% of cattle and 30–40% of small ruminants (Toure et al., 2012).
There is an agreement that this type of breeding preserves the environment and is viable, competitive
and a provider of seasonal work (Bouslikhane, 2015). In the Sahel region, livestock mobility is
essentially linked with pastoralism and it is driven by the need for access to natural resources and
livestock markets. Mobility practices are driven by the geo-climatic, economical and sociocultural
Figure 8: Principal movement pathways of live ruminants across North African and Middle East
countries. Adapted from information reported by Bouslikhane (2015), (Di Nardo et al.,
2011), Bouguedour and Ripani (2016), Jenet et al. (2016)
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conditions, including the search for water sources in the dry seasons, the need to move from areas
affected by diseases or inter-ethnic conflicts and banditry (Bouslikhane, 2015).
The recent unrests following the so-called Arabian Spring, the instability in Libya and the increased
insecurity in Sahel and Sahara regions followed by recrudescence of terrorism could be potential
factors for altering the main livestock mobility routes, thus contributing to concentration of livestock in
fewer areas and along fewer routes with unexpected spread of transboundary disease to new areas
(EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2015).
In this Region, the main animal movement routes are from the Sahel to coastal countries: from
Mali and Burkina Faso to supply Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin (‘central corridor’), from Chad,
Niger, Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso to supply Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin and
Togo, and from Mauritania and Mali to Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gambia and Guinea Bissau (‘western
route’) (Gerber, 2010). However, unofficial animal movements between Sahel and Maghreb countries
are well documented. Dromedary camels, probably arriving from Mauritania, were found serologically
positive for RVF in southern provinces in Morocco (El-Harrak et al., 2011) and small ruminants with
seroprevalence reaching 7% were found in the Sahrawi territories of Western Sahara, where animals
are typically traded between Mauritania and Mali towards Algeria (Di Nardo, 2014). Animals originating
from Chad and Sudan have been found in Libya, as well as sheep from Mali in the centre of Tunisia
(Bouguedour and Ripani, 2016).
Concerning the risk of introduction of RVFV into Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia or Libya through these
routes, the RVF epidemiological situation in West Africa is quite peculiar. Differently from East and
South Africa, where classical 5–15 years inter-epizootic cycles are observed, western African countries
have experienced in the last years an almost constant emergence of RVF outbreaks, and concurrent
human cases (Arsevska et al., 2016): in 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2015 in Mauritania, 2013, 2014 and
2018 in Senegal, 2016 in Niger, 2017 in Mali and Nigeria, 2018 in Gambia and 2019 in Chad.
No evidence of possible RVFV introduction could be demonstrated in Libya (Mahmoud et al., 2018).
However, these results must be carefully evaluated, especially regarding the representativeness of the
sampled animals, given the current difficulties in accessing rural areas in Libya.
In Tunisia, during a study conducted in the summer of 2014, 18 human blood samples were
positive for RVF. The serologically reactive samples were derived from febrile patients (n = 15, only
IgM reactivity) and from afebrile farmers and abattoir workers (n = 3, only IgG reactivity) (Bosworth
et al., 2016). These results indicate the occurrence of, at least, one undetected human outbreak of
RVF in Tunisia. However, these laboratory outcomes must be carefully interpreted in the light of the
performances of the diagnostic method used, the indirect immunofluorescence assay, which can be
characterised by poor specificity in several instances. In addition, despite these results, to date, no
RVF clinical cases were notified in Tunisia, neither in humans nor in animals.
3.1.5.2. East Africa routes
Four major RVF epidemics have been recorded in Egypt (1977, 1978, 1993 and 2003) (Kenawy et al.,
2018), but a low level of RVFV circulation was observed during the inter-epidemic periods in various areas
of the country along the Nile river (Mroz et al., 2017). Besides the local circulation of RVFV, the introduction
of live animals from Sudan is considered as an important source of infection for Egypt (Napp et al., 2018).
A vaccination programme is in place in Egypt, where every year a great number of animals are
vaccinated (General organization for Veterinary Services – Egypt) (Table 6) with an inactivated vaccine
(Zagazig H501 strain) produced by the Egyptian Veterinary Serum and Vaccine Research Institute
(VSVRI).13
Table 6: Vaccinated animals in Egypt in the 2016–2019 period
Year
Number of vaccinated animals
Cattle Buffaloes Sheep Goats Camels Total
2016 2,923,648 1,552,856 642,711 54,452 216,884 5,390,551
2017 5,131,555 2,519,915 783,501 125,581 240,459 8,801,011
2018 3,840,535 1,891,061 477,761 84,438 218,916 6,512,711
2019* 4,186,385 2,213,411 421,311 78,463 131,169 7,030,739
*: Up to September.
13 http://vsvri.com/Products/ProductsAnimal%201-4%20inactivated%20Rift%20Valley%20Fever%20Vaccine.html
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In addition, the well-documented live animal cross-border movements with Libya may represent a
further element of risk for RVF spread across northern Africa countries.
Recently, in October 2019, Sudan notified several human and animal RVF cases, causing great
concern in neighbouring countries, such as Egypt and Ethiopia, and in the trading partners, like Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain, which banned the import of live ruminants from Sudan.
3.1.5.3. Horn of Africa routes
The export of live animals from countries of the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula is a
well-accepted route. A substantial reduction was observed after year 2000 until 2007, when the Saudi
Arabian authorities banned the introduction of live ruminants and camels from Somalia and Djibouti, in
response to the introduction of RVFV in year 2000 through this route. Since 2007, the number of
animals imported into the Arabic Peninsula from the Horn of Africa increased progressively, awareness
has been raised about the risk of introduction of RVFV into Saudi Arabia. Last available statistics
(FAOSTAT, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data) for 2014 and 2015 show that around 7 and 7.8
million live domestic ruminants, respectively, were imported into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Table 7)
of which 98% were small ruminants (sheep and goats) and only around 100,000 dromedary camels.
Of these animals, 61% originated from Sudan, whereas 35% were coming from Somalia.
The volume of live animals traded along this route reaches a peak during religious festivities. Two
Muslim festivals must be considered: one (Lesser Bairam – Eid al-Fitr) falling at the end of Ramadan,
the other (Greater Bairam – Eid al-Adha) 70 days later at the end of the Islamic year.
In the Islamic lunar calendar, Eid al-Adha falls on the 10th day of Dhu al-Hijjah and lasts for four
days until the 13th day. In the international (Gregorian) calendar, the dates vary from year to year
drifting approximately 11 days earlier each year, so it may fall in the vector season. During these
Muslim celebrations, large numbers of sheep and goats are marketed for feasting and celebrations,
particularly for the Greater Bairam (the sacrifice feast).
These trade routes from countries of the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula were already
identified as the cause of RVFV introduction into Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 2000, as well as an important
way for the spread of other diseases, like foot and mouth disease (FMD) (Di Nardo et al., 2011).
To reduce the risk of introduction and spread of RVFV infection, the Middle East countries have
adopted several control measures on live animals imported from countries not free from RVF.
Considering the available information, some Middle East countries, such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia,
request that animals be tested for the presence of antibodies against RVFV. In particular, Saudi Arabia,
which is one of the larger importers of live animals from the Horn of Africa, requires that animals must
Table 7: Number of animals (camels, cattle, sheep, goats) imported into Saudi Arabia, Yemen,
Jordan and United Arab Emirates from countries of the Horn of Africa between 2003 and
2015 (FAOSTAT, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data)
Year
Exporting countries
Total
Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Somalia Sudan
2003 70,811 2,867 3,335 1,143,055 1,383,405 2,603,473
2004 199,777 2,895 6,110 206 762,533 1,930,122 2,901,643
2005 60,557 5,871 7,967 2,454 1,270,094 1,441,603 2,788,546
2006 82,350 400 11,779 1,160 1,260,143 1,440,851 2,796,683
2007 2,072,874 26,195 3,579 117,206 1,786,901 787,090 4,793,845
2008 77,655 92 475 39,377 1,344,108 1,461,707
2009 1,254,873 42,932 1,502,336 1,640,761 4,440,902
2010 265,843 20,544 2,018,253 1,823,583 4,128,223
2011 208,389 53,236 3,635,535 2,727,031 6,624,191
2012 479,006 443 34,789 3,945,769 3,668,696 8,128,703
2013 357,880 49,379 3,778,527 3,918,196 8,103,982
2014 388,651 24 7,330 2,765,597 4,110,817 7,272,419
2015 272,759 5,578 2,693 3,127,494 4,798,048 8,206,572
Total per
country
5,791,425 38,344 110,072 300,500 28,340,345 29,670,203 64,250,889
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be kept in quarantine locations for not less than 21 days, where they are clinically inspected and
serologically tested for various diseases, including RVF. Additional controls and quarantine periods are
applied in the port of arrival.
Concerning the evidence of RVFV presence in Middle East, apart from the well-known and well-
documented introduction of the virus into some regions across the borders between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen (Saudi Arabia: Jizan, Asir and Al Quenfadah regions; Yemen: Wadi Mawr in El Zuhrah district of
Hodeidah Governorate) (Kenawy et al., 2018), some papers had recently reported the possible
evidence of RVF infection in other countries:
• In Iraq, serum samples were collected from 1,215 sheeps in five distinct regions of Basrah
area (in the south of Iraq, close to Kuwait and Iran borders) and tested by c-ELISA for RVF,
and 108 (8.9%) resulted positive. The serological prevalence was significantly higher in
animals older than 3 years compared with other age groups (Muhsen, 2012). No information
about the origin of animals or other details, useful to identify the possible time and place of
exposure, were provided in the paper.
• In Turkey, serum samples collected from 72 dromedary camels during 2009–2012 and from
410 buffaloes from 1999 to 2001 were investigated for RVF using c-ELISA. One camel (1.4%)
and 35 buffaloes (Bubalus bubalis) (8.5%) samples were positive for RVF-specific antibodies.
The positive results were detected in four different provinces of Turkey: Amasya, Ankara,
Samsun and Afyon (Gur et al., 2017). In addition, Yilmaz et al. (2017) detected antibodies
against RVFV in 3.6%, 4.5% and 3.8% of tested children (n = 110), cattle (n = 200) and
sheep (n = 160), respectively (see Section 3.1.2.3).
• In Iran, from January 2016 to December 2016, blood samples were collected from 288
ruminants (118 cattle, 142 sheep and 28 goats) of both sexes in the Kurdistan Province of
western Iran. Clinical symptoms and history of abortions were recorded. The presence of
RVFV-specific antibodies was investigated by c-ELISA and indirect immunofluorescence assay
(IIFA). The results of both tests were positive for five (1.7%) out of a total of 288 animals,
which included two cattle out of 118 (1.7%), and three sheep out of 142 (2.1%). The results
of IIFA were correlated with the ELISA results. All animals were clinically normal.
It is very difficult to judge the relevance of these findings in the absence of official notification of RVF
cases in animals or humans up until today in these countries. A more solid evaluation of the results of
these studies could be done only with the availability of more detailed information about the origin and
the history of the animals, and a clearer picture of the animal disease situation of the ruminants living
around the locations where positive animals have been detected. In fact, given the epidemiology of the
disease, single sporadic animal cases are unlikely to occur in a susceptible population, and may be
explained only by animals being imported from infected areas or due to limitations of the diagnostic
methods (false positives).
On the other hand, the results of these studies show the potential for RVFV (as well as other new
emerging diseases) to move from Africa and the Middle East towards Europe, possibly facilitated by
the presence of unofficial and uncontrolled animal movements (Di Nardo et al., 2011) and by the
reduced levels of animal health controls in some territories due to conflicts and societal insecurity.
Key messages:
• The movement of live animals is the main risk factor for RVF spread from the African endemic
areas.
• Several pathways of livestock movements between sub-Saharan and North African countries
can be identified. It is reasonable to assume that a large part of these cross-border
movements is currently not subjected to veterinary checks.
• The trade from the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula and Middle East involves several
million live animals each year, thus representing a risk of RVF introduction into the Middle East.
3.1.6. Control measures
3.1.6.1. Measures foreseen by the legislation
According to the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1882, RVF belongs to the category A of the
listed diseases that do not normally occur in the Union and for which immediate eradication measures
must be taken as soon as it they are detected, as referred in Article 9(1)(a) of the Regulation (EU)
2016/429.
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In Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016
(‘Animal Health Law’) and in the Delegated Act supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, as regards animal health requirements for movements within
the Union of terrestrial animals and hatching eggs,14 control measures and activities have been
provided at different stages of the disease: preparedness, suspicion and confirmation.
RVF is a category A disease so the final aim is eradication, not just control or to report cases. The
controls in the Delegated Act will improve on 92/119 because better science about the pathogen and
the epidemiology is available.
3.1.6.2. Vaccines
At present, no vaccines have been authorised for use in the EU by the European Medicine Agency
(EMA, online). Their use for emergency vaccination should be ad hoc basis and authorised following
the proper EU procedure.
Formalin inactivated and live-attenuated Rift Valley fever type of vaccines (LAV) represent the most
developed and tested vaccines currently available for livestock immunisation. Both the inactivated and
the live-attenuated vaccines (Smithburn and MP-12 strains) have been obtained from virulent RVFV
isolates using conventional technologies, and represent the most sustainable strategy to mitigate the
impact of RVF on livestock agriculture.
The live modified Smithburn vaccine can readily be produced in large quantities at low cost, and
induces a durable immunity lasting at least 18 months following vaccination in sheep and cattle after a
single inoculation (Coackley et al., 1967), although in a proportion of pregnant female animals, it may
cause abortions or fetal teratology (Botros et al., 2006; Kamal, 2009). Genetic reassortment between
RVF field strains and the Smithburn strain has been described in mammals (Grobbelaar et al., 2011)
and mosquitoes (Turell et al., 2011).
In contrast to LAV vaccines, inactivated vaccines are described as safer, specifically for use in
pregnant animals, though they are expensive to produce and require the administration of booster
doses 3–4 weeks after initial vaccination to ensure adequate long-term protection (up to 38 weeks)
(Lagerqvist et al., 2012).
Inactivated vaccines are normally used in non-endemic RVFV countries (CFSPH, online; O'Brien et
al., 2016). Although both types of vaccines have contributed significantly to the control of RVF in
endemic countries of Africa, the requirement of repeated immunisations (for inactivated vaccines) and
risk of inducing teratogenic effects, abortion, and potential reassortment/reversion due to residual
neuro-invasiveness and neurovirulence (for the LAV vaccines) highlight the need for a new generation
of vaccines with a higher safety profile.
A critical advance over currently existing livestock vaccines would be the ability to discriminate
naturally infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA). A DIVA approach (vaccine and accompanying
diagnostic tests) is an essential requirement for vaccines to be used in both endemic and non-endemic
countries allowing compliance with mandatory international trade restrictions during active RVF
outbreaks.
Research focusing on RVF vaccine development has significantly increased in the past 10 years,
with the vaccines having already been evaluated in rigorous safety and efficacy trials in relevant
natural hosts, such as sheep and cattle. The availability of some of these new vaccines provides for
the first time a realistic possibility to provide safe, effective and inexpensive vaccines for use in adult,
pregnant and young animals.
RVF vaccines commercially available and vaccine candidates evaluated for their induced protection
in different animal models are presented in Table 8 and Table 9.
Preventive mass vaccination is the most effective means to control RVF circulation when climatic,
environmental and epidemiological evaluations suggest a high probability of RVF outbreaks.
14 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2019/EN/C-2019-4058-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF
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Table 8: RVF vaccines and vaccine candidates evaluated for their induced protection in different
animal models (adapted from Faburay et al., 2017). DIVA for differentiation between
naturally infected and vaccinated animals. NHP for non-human primates
Type of vaccine
Host species involved
in the protection
evaluation studies
Commercially
available
DIVA References
1. Live-attenuated vaccines (LAV)
1.1. Naturally attenuated
Smithburn strain Mice, sheep, goats, cattle Yes No Smithburn (1949) and Botros
et al. (2006)
MP-12 Mice, sheep, cattle, NHP,
humans
No, but conditionally
licensed to Zoetis Inc.
for animal vaccination
in the USA in 2013
No Caplen et al., (1985), Saluzzo
and Smith (1990), Vialat et al.
(1997), Morrill and Peters
(2011a, b) and Ikegami
(2017)
Clone13/Clone13T
(naturally NSs
deleted 74HB59
strain of the Central
African Republic)
Mice, sheep, goats, cattle
and camels
Yes Yes Muller et al. (1995), von
Teichman et al. (2011), Dungu
et al. (2013), Daouam et al.
(2015), Daouam et al. (2016),
Makoschey et al. (2016) and
Njenga et al. (2015)
1.2. Genetically modified attenuated
R566 Sheep No Yes Kortekaas et al. (2014)
Recombinant MP12
D/mutants
Mice, sheep, goats, cattle No Yes (Ikegami et al. (2006), Morrill
and Peters (2011a, b), Ly
et al. (2017), Boumart et al.
(2019) and Nyundo et al.
(2019)
Recombinant MP12-
Clone13
Mice No Yes Lihoradova et al. (2012)
Recombinant ZH501
D/mutants
Mice, sheep, NHP No Yes (Bird et al. (2008), Bird et al.
(2011) and Smith et al.
(2018)
Four segmented
RVFV
Mice, sheep No Yes Wichgers Schreur et al.
(2017)
2. Virus vectored based
Poxvirus Mice, sheep, goats, NHP No Yes Wallace et al. (2006), Pepin
et al. (2010), Soi et al. (2010),
Ayari-Fakhfakh et al. (2012),
Ayari-Fakhfakh et al. (2018)
Newcastle disease
virus
Mice, sheep, cattle No Yes Kortekaas et al. (2010a) and
Kortekaas et al. (2010b)
Adenovirus (CAdVax
and ChAdOx1)
Mice, sheep, goats, cattle,
camels
No Yes Holman et al. (2009),
Warimwe et al. (2013) and
Warimwe et al. (2016)
Modified vaccinia
Ankara (MVA) virus
Mice No Yes Papin et al. (2011), Lopez-Gil
et al. (2013) and Busquets
et al. (2014)
Equine herpervirus
type1
Sheep No Yes Said et al. (2017)
Alphavirus Mice, sheep No Yes Heise et al. (2009)
3. Non-replicable vaccines
3.1. Inactivated type
NDBR103 (Entebbe
virus)
Mice, humans No No Randall et al. (1962) and Eddy
et al. (1981)
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Type of vaccine
Host species involved
in the protection
evaluation studies
Commercially
available
DIVA References
TSI-GSD 200
(Entebbe virus)
Humans No No Pittman et al. (1999)
Formalin inactivated
(South African
strain)
Sheep, cattle Yes No Barnard et al (1977) and
Harrington et al (1980)
Formalin inactivated
(Menya/Sheep/258
strain)
Sheep, goats, cattle,
buffaloes, camels
Yes No (Kamal (2011) and Fawzy and
Helmy (2019)
BEI inactivated
(strain ZH501)
Sheep, goats, cattle Yes No
3.2. DNA and subunit based
Recombinant Gn
protein
Mice, sheep, cattle No Schmaljohn et al. (1989),
Wallace et al. (2006), De Boer
et al. (2010), Faburay et al.
(2016)
DNA Mice No (Spik et al. (2006), Wallace
et al. (2006) and Lagerqvist
et al. (2009)
Sub-unit vaccine
(Gn-e/Gn-Gc)
Mice, sheep No Yes Schmaljohn et al. (1989),
De Boer et al. (2010),
Kortekaas et al. (2012) and
(Chrun et al. (2019)
3.3. Virus Like Particle (VLP) based
VLPs Mice No Yes (Liu et al. (2008), Naslund
et al. (2009), De Boer et al.
(2010), Mandell et al. (2010)
and Mbewana et al. (2019)
4. Single cycle replicable based vaccines
4.1. RVFV replicon
particles (RRP) or
non-spreading RVFV
(NSR)
Mice, sheep No No Kortekaas et al. (2011), Dodd
et al. (2012) and Oreshkova
et al. (2013)
4.2. MP-12-based
single-cycle
replicable particle
Mice No No Murakami et al. (2016) and
Terasaki et al. (2016)
Table 9: Details of the RVF vaccines commercially available and countries of licence and/or use
Commercial
Vaccine (viral
strain)
Manufacturer
Animal
species
Country of licence
or use (u)
Notes
RIFTVAX TM
(Smithburn strain)
Kenya Veterinary Vaccine
Producing Institute
(Kenya)
cattle, sheep
and goats
Kenya
Rift Valley Fever
(Smithburn strain)*
Veterinary Serum and
Vaccine Research
Institute (Egypt)
cattle, sheep
and goats
Egypt Smithburn strain
imported from South
Africa
Rift Valley formalin
inactivated (Menya/
Sheep/258 strain)
VACSERA (Egypt) cattle, sheep
and goats
Egypt
Rift Valley BEI
inactivated (ZH501
strain)
Veterinary Serum and
Vaccine Research
Institute (Egypt)
cattle, sheep
and goats
Egypt
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Key messages:
• No vaccines against RVF have been so far authorised for use in the EU. Their use for
emergency vaccination should be on an ad hoc basis and authorised following the proper EU
procedure.
• Both live-attenuated and inactivated vaccines are commercially available for RVF and have
contributed significantly to the control of RVF in endemic countries. However, they require
repeated vaccinations (inactivated vaccines) and retain the risk of teratogenic effects, abortion
and potential reassortment/reversion to virulence (live attenuated).
• Several novel candidate vaccines are in the final stages of validation and, among them, most
allow to discriminate naturally infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA).
• Preventive mass vaccination is the most effective means to control RVF circulation when
climatic, environmental and epidemiological evaluations suggest a high probability of RVF
outbreaks. However, the use of vaccines should be carefully evaluated once the virus
transmission has already been detected in the area since it may intensify transmission among
herds through needle propagation of the virus.
3.1.6.3. Vector control
Up until now, there are no records on the use of vector control methods for decreasing
transmission of RVFV. Theoretically, RVFV epidemics can be controlled by applying larvicides and/or
adulticides during specific moments of the cycle of transmission. In Africa, it is suggested that larvicide
treatments should be conducted after heavy rains in the flooded dambo areas before the occurrence
of primary vectors (Aedes spp) and/or secondary vectors (mainly Culex spp.). Use of adulticides is
recommended after the period of breeding of secondary vectors in stagnant waters, since those
vectors would increase transmission due to high density population in the area (Linthicum et al.,
2016). The large number of mosquito species that transmit RVFV in Africa and the distribution and
extension of breeding sites, particularly after heavy rains, makes it very difficult to successfully apply
any method of control on a large scale to prevent transmission of the virus (Balenghien et al., 2013).
In addition, while control by vaccination is still the main tool for the disease and vector controls, being
desirable from a One Health perspective, it is still widely under-implemented (Fawzy and Helmy, 2019).
Mosquito control methods are well developed in the EU, and, differently from other vectors such as
Culicoides spp., breeding sites can be controlled either by physical or chemical/biological methods (i.e.
Bacillus thuringiensis). Examples of mosquito control can be found for species causing nuisance in
Commercial
Vaccine (viral
strain)
Manufacturer
Animal
species
Country of licence
or use (u)
Notes
Rift Valley Fever
formalin inactivated
(SA field strain)
Ondersterpoort Biological
products
(South Africa)
cattle, sheep
and goats
South Africa, Namibia,
Tanzania (u),
Botswana (u)
Rift Valley Fever live
attenuated
(Smithburn strain)
Ondersterpoort Biological
products
(South Africa)
cattle, sheep
and goats
South Africa, Namibia,
Egypt (u), Kenia (u),
Zimbabwe (u),
Tanzania (u), Sudan
(u), Saudi Arabia (u),
DRC (u)
From serial passages
of the Entebbe strain
RVF Clone13 live
attenuated
(clone 13)
Ondersterpoort Biological
products
(South Africa)
cattle, sheep
and goats
South Africa, Namibia,
Botswana, Zambia,
Mozambique,
Zimbabwe (u), Kenya
(u), Senegal (u)
Clone of 74HB59 strain
from a human patient
in the Central African
Republic
Riftovax-LR live
attenuated (clone
13T)
MCI Sante Animale
(Morocco)
cattle and
camels
Morocco, Senegal (u),
Mali (u)
Thermostable Clone 13
vaccine
Riftovax-SR live
attenuated (clone
13T)
MCI Sante Animale
(Morocco)
sheep and
goats
Morocco, Senegal (u),
Mali (u)
Thermostable Clone 13
vaccine
*: Not produced at the present.
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cities and periurban areas (e.g. Ae. albopictus), as well as for mosquitoes present in wetlands and
coastal environments (e.g. Ae. vexans and Ae. caspius). The control of vectors in urban and periurban
areas is mainly related to the control of transmission to humans, while methods used for controlling in
wetlands and salt marsh environments can be related to both humans and animals (domestic and
wild). In the EU urban areas, mosquitoes are mainly controlled by community education, source
removal to avoid oviposition and larval development, biological insecticides such as B. thuringiensis
israelensis (Bti) and Lysinibacillus sphaericus (Ls), Insect Growth Regulators (IGR diflubenzuron,
pyriproxyfen) in some MS, as well as surface films that impede larval breathing. Adulticides (e.g.
outdoor spraying of pyrethroids) are used in adult mosquito resting areas in case of local transmission
of imported arbovirosis such as dengue, Zika and chikungunya, or after natural catastrophes such as
floods, which increase breeding sites. All these methods can be applied in the EU in case RVFV is
introduced and transmitted by local vector species (e.g. Cx. pipiens), but there is no information about
the effect of those control measures in the rate of transmission of the virus.
There are previous experiences in Europe on vector control to decrease disease transmission.
Vectors of malaria were controlled during the 50s mainly because of environmental water management
and the use of DDT. Sanitation is still one of the cornerstones of mosquito control in Europe; however,
the use of DDT is forbidden and even the wide use of other adulticides is very limited due to
environmental concerns. Similar to RVFV, other viruses such as West Nile (WNV) are also mainly
transmitted by Cx. pipiens s.l. Outbreaks of WNV are detected each year in the EU (Haussig et al.,
2018) and despite vector control measures being applied, there is no information on their impact on
virus transmission. Main preventive measures are based on source reduction strategies, while ground
insecticide treatments are recommended just in the case of outbreaks (Bellini et al., 2014).
Currently, mosquito species (e.g. Ae. vexans, Ae. caspius, Cx. pipiens) breeding in large freshwater
flooding areas, salt marshes and irrigation channels are regularly controlled in the EU, mostly because
of them being a nuisance, by the use of Bti and Ls (Becker and Zgomba, 2007).
Additional methods for controlling adults are available, such as the Sterile Insect Technique (SIT)
that is currently in use in Italy for the control of the invasive Asian tiger mosquito (Ae. albopictus)
(Bellini et al., 2013). This method is area wide based and in certain conditions, and, theoretically, is
able to reduce the mosquito population, having an impact on the transmission of the pathogen.
However, some of the main constraints of this technique is the cost and that it is species specific,
which means that SIT should be developed for each of the species related to the transmission of RVFV.
If RVFV is introduced into Europe, according to results on vector competence in laboratory trials, it is
likely that several species of mosquitoes will be able to transmit it (e.g. Cx. pipiens, Ae. vexans and
Ae. albopictus) (Ducheyne et al., 2013; Brustolin et al., 2017).
Similarly, to other vector-borne diseases, such as bluetongue, blood-feeding insect repellents may
play a role in protecting animals from vector bites. In the EU, mosquito repellents are mainly used for
high value animals (e.g. horses) (Chapman et al., 2018) and little data are available about its efficacy
in livestock animals that could be widely affected by RVFV.
Key messages:
• There is no information about the use of vector control strategies to decrease transmission of
RVFV in Africa. Field implementation appears to be challenging due to the large number of
vector mosquito species and the wide extension of breeding sites.
• Mosquito control tools are well developed in the EU for urban, periurban and natural
environments, mainly by using source reduction and biological origin insecticides (e.g. Bacillus
thuringiensis israelensis).
• There is no information about the efficacy of the current mosquito control tools for decreasing
arboviruses present in the EU (e.g. West Nile virus) that are transmitted by the same species
that transmit RVFV in Africa.
3.2. Risk of introduction of RVF into EU
3.2.1. Possible pathways for introduction into EU
RVFV can be introduced into a new region by several pathways (EFSA, 2005, 2013). The role of
infected animals, infected vectors, contaminated products and infected humans is reviewed in the
following sections.
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3.2.1.1. Animals
Potential pathways for RVF introduction into the EU are the trade of livestock or the uncontrolled
movement of livestock and/or captive susceptible animals (zoo animals). RVF virus replicates to very
high titres in many species (e.g. viraemia of 104 to 109 PFU/ml for several days). The viraemia can last
up to 4–5 days in sheep (Weingartl et al., 2014; Faburay et al., 2016) and 1–7 days in cattle (McIntosh
et al., 1973).
Livestock importation
The movement of live animals into the Union is regulated by several pieces of legislation (which will
be brought together under the AHL, 2016/429), which means there are very few countries outside the
EU which are approved for the import of live animals, in particular ungulates (ruminants and camelids).
The list of these countries is in Annex I of 206/2010/EU. There are no countries approved which are
endemic for RVF. Imports of non-livestock ungulates between confined establishments may be agreed
by an EU MS provided a risk assessment is undertaken on the establishment of origin and the animals
are moved with a certificate and with the health attestation and pre-movement testing and quarantine
according to 780/2013/EU.
According to the EUROSTAT database, there is no movement of live bovines or live sheep and goats
from extra-EU countries that are affected or endemic of RVF towards the EU. Such movements, in fact,
are forbidden by the EU legislation.15 In the UN COMTRADE database,16 some figures are reported
about the importation of very few cattle (2–4 individuals) from Botswana towards Germany and France
between 2015 and 2018, but these are probably zoo animals normally subjected to strict checks. In the
same database, no trade is recorded for other mammals like primates, rabbits, hares, camels.
Uncontrolled movements of animals
In the EU, despite several directives and regulations pertaining to the import of animals and
products of animal origin and veterinary controls on importation, uncontrolled movements of animals
and animal products still occur worldwide and may favour the spread of transboundary diseases. The
illegal transport of live animals is linked to several drivers at the socio-economical (poverty,
urbanisation, demographic change), political (unrests) or geographical (e.g. droughts, remote areas)
levels (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2015). Nevertheless, given the affected countries in
Africa without geographical contiguity to MSs, the uncontrolled transboundary movement of live
animals from those countries to EU can be considered very difficult if not impossible.
3.2.1.2. Animal products
Import of fresh or frozen meat from ungulates from third countries is also regulated under 206/2010
(Annex II) there are only a few sub-Saharan countries authorised; the meat must be deboned and
matured to a pH which would destroy viruses including RVF. Milk products import are controlled by
Regulation (EC) 605/2010 where the list of authorised third countries is indicated, there are only a few
African/Middle East third countries approved, and then, only for heat-treated products.
Rift Valley fever virus can be transmitted to humans also through direct contact with contaminated
bodily fluids and tissues and fresh animal products such as milk or meat. The degree of exposure to
RVFV-infected bodily fluids and tissues varies by types of behaviours engaged for occupational tasks.
While previous studies have included exposure to milk, their primary focus on livestock exposures has
been on animal handling, breeding and slaughter. Data from multiple field surveys in Kenya were
analysed and revealed that exposure to raw milk may contribute to a significant number of cases of
RVFV, especially during outbreaks and in endemic areas, and that some animal species may be
associated with a higher risk for RVFV exposure (Grossi-Soyster et al., 2019).
The above is linked to fresh products. Because RVFV is highly sensitive to low pH and thus quickly
inactivated in maturing meat or dairy products, this pathway of possible introduction of RVFV into EU
from infected areas has not been considered in this assessment, also because of the limited amount of
trade of these commodities from RVF-infected areas. Other biological material such as serum, plasma
15 Council Directive 91/496 on veterinary checks on animals entering the EU from third countries; Council Directive 97/78/EC on
organisation of veterinary checks on products entering EU from third countries; Commission Decision 2003/623 about
development of an integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces; Commission Regulation 136/2004 on the
procedures for veterinary checks at EU BIPs on products imported from third countries; Commission Decision 2007/275 on
lists of animals and products to be subject to controls at Border Inspection Posts (BIPs); Commission Regulation 206/2009 on
the introduction into the Community of personal consignments of products of animal origin.
16 https://comtrade.un.org/
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or vaccines may represent a source of infection only if moved intentionally such as in bioterrorism acts,
but the chance of this is considered to be of less importance compared to other pathways.
3.2.1.3. Vectors
Due to its size and biology, the different biological stages of mosquitoes (egg, larva, pupa and
adult) can be transported over long distances by different means of transportation, such as airplanes,
boats and road vehicles (Lounibos, 2002). In addition, wind streams are able to transport mosquito
adults in the so-called ‘aerial plankton’. During the last 50 years, air, sea and road transportation have
increased significantly, increasing the introduction of arboviruses and in some cases, their vectors
(Tatem et al., 2006; Tatem et al., 2012).
Some species of mosquitoes, which are potential vectors for RVFV, such as Ae. aegypti, Ae.
albopictus and Ae. japonicus, share a similar ecology adaptation to oviposit in man-made water
containers and feed on human blood (Calzolari, 2016). Therefore, they have higher probability of being
passively transported by human means compared to other species that breed in non-human related
habitats and have animals as preferred host (e.g. Culex species). Passive transportation and
introduction in new areas has been widely recognised for Ae. aegypti, Ae. albopictus (Medlock et al.,
2012; Collantes et al., 2015) and Ae. japonicus (Kaufman and Fonseca, 2014).
The biology of some of the species also favours the transportation. For example, eggs of some
strains of Ae. albopictus are able to survive prolonged periods without water showing a true biological
diapause (Tran et al., 2013). This feature makes this species an excellent candidate for being
transported by different commodities such as used tyres, as well as ‘lucky bamboo’ (Dracaena
sanderiana; Dracaenaceae) and Bromeliaceae plants (Schaffner, 2003; Scholte et al., 2008; Scholte
et al., 2012). In fact, second-hand tyre trade has been identified as the major source of Aedes invasive
mosquito species introduction in Europe and it is well documented in European countries such as
France since 1999 (Roche et al., 2015). On the other hand, Culex species lack drought resistant eggs,
since oviposition is conducted on water layer and not in the walls of small containers, such as is the
case of Aedes species. Consequently, there is relatively low risk of transport of Culex species by means
of transport of commodities (i.e. tyres) compared to the Aedes ones. This is relevant for the RVFV
transmission, since Aedes species are considered primary vectors in Africa, and they are able to
maintain the virus in drought resistant eggs that would emerge as infected females starting
transmission in nearby animals. Additionally, Culex species are considered as secondary vectors, in
combination with some Anopheles and Mansonia species, that contribute to increase transmission of
RVFV (Sang et al., 2017).
According to the assessment performed by the Vectornet consortium (Wint et al., 2020), of the 39
identified potential vectors of RVFV, five were ranked highest based on their potential role as vector, and
their behavioural and ecological traits influencing the risk of transportation. These species were
Anopheles pharoensis, Aedes aegypti, Mansonia uniformis, Aedes mcintoshi and Culex quinquefasciatus.
The African countries ranked according to the presence of the 10 highest potential RVFV mosquito
vectors are South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda (section 2.2.2.1). These
countries are also heavily connected to the EU Member States and contributed for 72% of the direct
flights from the at-risk countries to the EU Member States in 2018.
From the five species of mosquitoes selected with the highest rank to be transported from RVFV-
affected countries in Africa, only Ae. aegypti (only in Madeira island and sporadic detection at Schiphol
International airport, the Netherlands) is present in the EU.
The list of RVFV potential vectors present at the EU can be checked at the EFSA’s vector-borne
disease map journals.17
Passive transportation by air, sea and road
Aircraft introduction
Adult mosquitoes have been detected in air cabins and gangways (Eritja et al., 2000; Karch et al.,
2001; Bataille et al., 2009). The number of mosquitoes found inside aircrafts vary from 2.25 WNV-
infected mosquitoes/year on 74 flights from USA to Barbados (0.03 mosquitoes/aircraft) (Douglas
et al., 2007); 50 mosquitoes on 89863 aircraft in a 9-year survey (0.0005 mosquitoes/aircraft) (Le
Maitre and Chadee, 1983) to 686 mosquitoes on 307 aircrafts (2.2 mosquitoes/aircraft) (Russell et al.,
1984). Haseyama et al. (2007) identified 26 mosquitoes on 2161 flights (ffi1 mosquito each 100
17 https://efsa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid = 5caa3b6f07684ce881301ea2326bc811
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flights) arriving to Narita Airport in Japan from 2001 to 2005. This study was also used by Brown et al.
(2012) to estimate by modelling, the number of WNV positive mosquitoes entering to UK via flights
from USA. Results from the model indicated that there was a very high risk of importation of WNV-
infected mosquito from the USA to UK. However, the authors also recognised that there is a high level
of uncertainty when estimating the number of mosquitoes per aircraft. In the Netherlands, Scholte
et al. (2014) found 14 mosquitoes in 10 flights from a total of 38 inspected flights with origin from
different locations. All mosquito interceptions were recorded in flights arriving from Africa. The study
conducted by Mier-y-Teran-Romero et al. (2017) estimated that approximately an average of 0.91
mosquitoes (95%CI: 0.00009–5.3) were found per aircraft after analysing 17 studies of the presence
of mosquitoes on 559,579 aircraft from 1931 to 1999. It was concluded that malaria was 1000 times
and dengue 200 times more likely to be introduced by infected travellers when compared to the
introduction via infected mosquitoes. Similarly, the overall probability of introduction of RFVF vectors
through human transportation was considered of minor importance in comparison with the probability
of movement of RVFV-infected animals in a previous EFSA opinion (EFSA, 2013). The low number of
mosquitoes transported by air was also confirmed by a recent detailed report on the mosquito
interception at airports of New Zealand from 2001 to 2018, showing that only 83 mosquitoes were
intercepted (5 mosquitoes/year), including 15 adults of Ae. aegypti and one adult of Ae. albopictus
(Ammar et al., 2019). In general, mosquitoes transported in airplanes are considered less probable to
establish due to the low number of adults transported. However, despite its low number, for some
diseases such as malaria and dengue, one single infected female may have important epidemiological
relevance because of the cases detected in the surroundings of airports in disease-free countries
(Gratz et al., 2000; Whelan et al., 2012). There is a probability that RVFV vectors (i.e. Culex species)
may also be introduced by plane and therefore to transmit the virus in the surroundings of airports;
however, this probability should be considered very low according to models obtained for human
diseases (Mier-y-Teran-Romero et al., 2017). This also depends on the number of flights connecting
RVF-infected countries and Europe, since the number of vectors can be scaled up (Figure 9).
Disinsection of aircrafts is recommended by WHO (WHO, 2016a), in particular to prevent the
spread of human diseases (yellow fever, dengue and malaria, etc. . .) and was updated after the
outbreaks of the Zika virus in 2016 (WHO, 2016b). Disinsection consists of insecticide treatment of
aircraft interiors and holds, and the current procedures (i.e. pre-flight; blocks away; top-of-descent;
and residual treatment) are considered efficacious for mosquito elimination from aircrafts (Russell and
Paton, 1989) (WHO, 2016b). However, up to now there is no evidence of the efficacy of these
measures in preventing VBD transmission compared to the high volume of infected humans that are
transported on a regular basis (Grout, 2015; Mier-y-Teran-Romero et al., 2017). There is also a lack of
information on the efficacy of vector control procedures to prevent the introduction of VB animal
diseases by infected mosquitoes. Due to the importance of human diseases such as malaria, dengue,
chikungunya and yellow fever, a vector-borne disease airline importation risk tool (Vector-borne
Disease Airport Importation Risk Tool, http://vbd-air.com/) has been developed for estimating the risk
of disease transmission due to aircraft transportation considering global vector and disease distribution
as well climate and seasonality (Huang et al., 2012). To our knowledge, there is not an equivalent tool
in the case of vector-borne animal diseases.
According to the assessment conducted by Vectornet (Van Bortel et al., 2020), the probability of
importation of vectors through air was driven by the number of direct flights from at-risk countries to
the respective EU Member State. The probability was around 0.5 (from 0.579 to 0.452) for the
Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy, followed by Spain, Poland, Belgium and Austria with a
probability of 0.287, 0.204, 0.202 and 0.163, respectively.
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Sea transport introduction
Introduction and worldwide expansion of invasive Aedine species such as Ae. albopictus has been
related to ports with high traffic volumes that increase the risk of invasion from areas that share
similar eco-climate conditions (Grout, 2015). Sea routes seem to play a major role in long distance
dispersion of Aedes invasive species compared to air traffic volume either by transporting eggs in tyres
and/or adults in plants. The same can be said for high-risk sea traffic routes identified for Anopheles
species in Africa (Tatem et al., 2006).
Introduction of Ae. albopictus by sea transport has been recognised in Italy (Dalla Pozza et al.,
1994), France (Roche et al., 2015) and the Netherlands (Scholte et al., 2008). In general, there is
limited information about the number of mosquitoes detected in sea transport in comparison with air
transport. Dalla Pozza et al. (1994) found 380 larvae in 10 airplane tyres transported from USA, while
Scholte et al. (2008) found 569 adults in 724 shipments (41 million plants) of ‘lucky bamboo’
importations to the Netherlands from China during 2006 and 2007. In New Zealand, 161 mosquito
interceptions were recorded from 2001 to 2018 (9.5 mosquitoes/year). From those, the majority were
Ae. albopictus, Ae. aegypti and Cx. quinquefasciatus (Ammar et al., 2019).
Road transport introduction
There is evidence that adult mosquitoes can be locally dispersed by road vehicles. A work
conducted in the Barcelona area estimated that between 3 and 16 of every 1000 cars were carrying
adult tiger mosquitoes during the summer period (Eritja et al., 2017). There is also evidence of Ae.
albopictus eggs detected in resting areas along highways far away from the established area, which is
consistent with a ‘leapfrog’ model of dispersion of adults inside vehicles (Roche et al., 2015; Tavecchia
et al., 2017). Similarly, Egizi et al. (2016) also showed the role of humans in the transportation along
roads for the spread of Ae. japonicus in several states of the USA.
Figure 9: Number of outbound civil flights in 2016–2018 from countries that have reported RVF
outbreaks in the same period
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Wind introduction
Verdonschot and Besse-Lototskaya (2014) reviewed active and passive movement of mosquitoes. They
provide a summary of the findings in published literature for long distance windborne dispersal for different
species of mosquitoes. The range of windborne transfer was from 97 km for Ae. vigilax to 850 km for Cx.
pipiens pipiens. For other potential RVFV vectors such as An. Pharoensis, Cx. tritaeniorhynchus and Ae.
Vexans, they reported windborne transportation over 280, 500 and 740 km, respectively.
There is circumstantial evidence of windborne transportation of mosquitoes of at least 500 km from
Sudan that resulted in epidemics of RVFV in 1977 in Egypt (Sellers et al., 1982; Pedgley, 1983). There
is also evidence of mosquito transportation by prevailing winds, such as bovine ephemeral fever
outbreaks in Israel in 1990, 1999 and 2004, with transport of mosquitoes 180 km from Egypt to the
Jordan Valley (Yeruham et al., 2010).
Active dispersal
In general, it is considered that active flying of mosquitoes would transport them to maximum
distances between 50 m and 50 km, with the average flight range being between 25 m and 6 km
(Verdonschot and Besse-Lototskaya, 2014). Linthicum et al. (1985) studied the active dispersal of
potential RVF vectors (e.g. Ae. mcintoshi, originally reported as Ae. lineatopennis) in Kenya. In
general, they found that the mean dispersal of both males and females was limited to 0.15 km during
45 days after adult emergence. Adults of invasive Aedes species are considered weak flyers, with a
capacity of dispersal of hundreds of metres based on mark recapture studies (Vavassori et al., 2019).
For example, it is known that Ae. j. japonicus was unable to expand beyond one tyre recycling centre
in Belgium (Damiens et al., 2014). For some vector species (Anopheles spp.) related to other diseases
such as Malaria, active seasonal migration at high altitude (40–290 m) with displacements of up to
300 km aided by prevalent winds has been described in the Sahel area in Africa(Huestis et al., 2019).
In this case, it resulted in a massive movement of mosquitoes (80,000 to 44 million) in a combination
with active migration facilitated by prevalent winds. Up until now, such migration behaviour has not
been described for the RVFV vector species elsewhere.
For this opinion and according to the assessment conducted by the Vectornet Consortium (Van
Bortel et al., 2020), the vector shipped by road transport was considered absent or negligible because,
based on the available data, the international annual road freight transport was zero for all countries
and over all reporting years. In addition, it was assumed that it is very unlikely that mosquitoes are
transported alive from African RVFV at-risk countries to EU MS through wind since because of the long
distance (e.g. more than 1000 km from the border of Sudan to Crete).
3.2.1.4. Humans
The great majority of cases of infection with RVFV in humans is asymptomatic. For the small
proportion with clinical signs, the majority present with a self-resolving influenza-like syndrome. In
some cases, however, RVFV epidemics can involve hundreds of individuals. The manifestation of severe
RVF disease cases may include a wide range of clinical signs including hepatitis, retinitis, delayed-onset
encephalitis and, in the most severe cases, haemorrhagic disease (Pepin et al., 2010).
Although sick people can develop significant levels of viraemia for a few days (EFSA Panel on
Animal Health and Welfare, 2005; Maurice et al., 2018), humans are considered dead-end hosts in the
epidemiological cycle of RVF and human–human transmission of the virus has never been described
(WHO18). Nosocomial transmissions were never reported in Saudi Arabia (Al-Hamdan et al., 2015) or in
Egypt during the outbreaks there. However, because nosocomial transmission is theoretically possible,
the WHO recommends Standard Precautions in all cases and extra infection control measures to
prevent contact with the patient’s blood and body fluids and contaminated surfaces or materials such
as clothing and bedding, especially in patients affected by haemorrhagic syndromes (WHO).
3.2.2. Selection of relevant pathways
Considering the information presented in Section 3.2.1, the pathways of introduction to be further
considered are:
• the movement of infected (pre-viraemic and viraemic) animals (traded or uncontrolled
movements) and
18 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/rift-valley-fever/rvf-presentation.pdf?ua=
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• movement of infected vectors by passive movements when shipped by flight, containers or
road transport.
These two pathways are considered in the MINTRISK model.
3.2.3. Estimation of parameters to run MINTRISK model
For the estimation of risk of introduction, MINTRISK requires answers to four groups of questions
related to RVF: worldwide occurrence, rate of entry, level of transmission and probability of
establishment. For each question, an answer provided in a semi-quantitative scale and a related level
of uncertainty (low/moderate/high/unknown) should be given. The questions, the values used to
answer each of them, and the reasoning is provided in Section 2.2.2.2.
3.2.4. Results of risk of introduction of RVF by MINTRISK model
3.2.4.1. Risk of introduction of RVF into each MS
The MINTRISK model has been used to calculate the scores for the worldwide occurrence, rate of
entry, level of transmission and probability of establishment for each MS for both animal and vector
pathways (median, lower and upper confidence interval). The score estimates of worldwide occurrence
are the same for all MS, given that the same input was used for the area of origin of RVF. It is low for
the animal pathway (median 0.3; CI 0.16–0.45) and high for the vector pathway (median 0.7; CI
0.43–0.97).19
The rate of entry for the animal pathway in all MS is close to zero, because the number of imported
animals is also close to zero. For the vector pathway, the results combined for both air and maritime
transport are shown in Figure 10. The entry score (sc) translates into rate of entry (number of entries/
year) using the following formula Rate of entry = 10^[5 * (sc-1)] as indicated in (EFSA Panel on
Animal Health and Welfare, 2017).
Figure 10 shows the median values and the confidence intervals. The median values are close to
zero (see Annex A.5 for exact values). The highest values of the rate of entry have been assessed for
France (median: 0.000282 introductions/year, CI: 8.9*107; 0.056), Germany (median: 0.000251
introductions/year; CI: 3.9*107; 0.11) and the Netherlands (median: 0.000251 introductions/year; CI:
106; 0.056), with Germany having the highest upper confidence interval (0.11 entries/year). Tit
should be noted that 0.05 entries/year would correspond to one entry every 20 years (reciprocal
number). The higher values for entry are due to the greater number of connections by air and sea
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Figure 10: Rate of entry of RVF for the vector pathway (for country codes see Glossary)
19 See Annex 10.4 for categorisation of scores in MINTRISK.
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transports with African RVF-infected countries. Considering the upper confidence interval (linked to
uncertainty), other countries like Cyprus, Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal showed greater rates
of entry of vectors up to 0.06 entries/year (see Annex A.1 for details on calculation of number of
imported vectors). It should also be noted that these uncertainty levels are derived from a series of
components linked to the air and sea connection between an affected country and MSs and they are
not related to the situation for mosquito survival or abundance within the country (e.g. Denmark or
Luxemburg). The major components that influence the levels of uncertainty in the estimation of rate of
entry among the countries are the maritime connections (not only air connection) that have a higher
uncertainty due to the major uncertainty for this pathway for survival of mosquitoes at destination.
Further details are provided in the report by Vectornet (ref to be added).
The qualitative score of the entry of vectors (estimated based on median values, for the
assignment of qualitative categories see Annex A.4) is considered ‘very low’ or ‘low’ in all MSs
(Table 10).
The level of transmission linked to the presence of vectors in MS, R0 and proportion of susceptible
animals is estimated as ‘moderate’ in all MSs (the transmission score translated into reproduction ratio
(R0) would give a median value of 1.77 (0.47–6.68) for both animal and vector pathways).
The results of the probability of establishment for the animal and vector pathways are shown in
Figure 11. The establishment score presented in Annex A.5 translates into establishment probability
using the following formula: Establishment_Probability = 10^[5 x (score-1)] as indicated in (EFSA
Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2017).
The probability of the establishment of RVFV transmission, once introduced, varies among the EU
MS according to the introduction pathway considered. The scores in Figure 11 are influenced by the
host density, the presence of the vectors and in particular by the temperatures that allow vector
activity (see Section 2.2.2.2), leading to higher scores in the southern MS compared with northern EU.
Considering the qualitative assessment of the probability of the establishment as in Table 10, for the
introduction through infected animals, the highest probability of RVFV establishment (‘very high’, median:
0.28, CI:0.11–0.71), has been assessed for Greece, Malta and Portugal, followed by ‘high to very high’ for
Cyprus (median: 0.1, CI:0.02–0.35) and Italy (median: 0.1, CI:0.02–0.35), ‘high’ for Belgium (median:
0.028, CI:0.01–0.071) and the Netherlands (median: 0.028, CI:0.011–0.071), moderate to high for
Croatia (median: 0.01, CI:0.002–0.039) and France (median: 0.01, CI:0.002–0.035). For the introduction
through infected vectors, ‘very high’ probability of RVFV transmission establishment is assessed for
Belgium (median: 0.28, CI:0.12–0.70), Greece (median: 0.28, CI:0.12–0.70), Malta (median: 0.28,
CI:0.12–0.70) and the Netherlands (median: 0.28, CI:0.12–0.70), ‘high to very high’ for United Kingdom
(median: 0.1; CI 0.028–0.35), ‘high’ probability is reported for Luxembourg, Portugal (median: 0.028; CI:
0.012; 0.07); ‘moderate to high’ for Cyprus, Ireland, Italy (median: 0.01; CI: 0.0028; 0.035). The
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Figure 11: Probability of establishment of RVF in each MS for animal and vector pathway
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uncertainty on the true values of the parameters used for establishing the probability of establishment
was set as low in all MS. However, the range included in the confidence intervals around the
estimates, derived from the stochastic calculation done by MINTRISK, was wide enough to contain in
certain cases more than one qualitative category (see Annex A.5).
The qualitative results of the assessment of the probability of establishment are shown in Table 10.
The score of the overall risk of introduction has been calculated through the MINTRISK model by
combining the rate of entry, level of transmission and probability of establishment. For clarity, it can be
expressed as the number of expected RVF epidemics/year by the following formula (EFSA Panel on
Animal Health and Welfare, 2017)):
No. epidemics/year ¼ 10^ ½5 ðMINTRISK score 0:8Þ
The results of this are shown in the graph in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Overall risk of introduction: estimated number of no. epidemics/year of RVF in the MSs by MINTRISK
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From the graph in Figure 10, it can be observed that for the animal pathway the risk of introducing
RVF is very low (not zero because of the uncertainty in the stochastic calculation), with a highest
median value of epidemics/year of 7*106 for Spain and still 0.002 epidemics/year considering the
upper confidence interval. This may be due to the strict EU policy on animal import from extra-EU
territories and border checks.
On the other hand, for the vector pathway, due to the number of air and sea connections with RVF
affected countries, when considering the median values, the highest value is registered for the
Netherlands with 0.0044 epidemics/year, meaning one epidemic every 227 years, followed by Malta
with 0.0025 epidemics/year (one epidemics every 400 years), Belgium and Greece (0.0014 epidemics/
year, one epidemic every 700 years). In the worst-case scenario and considering the uncertainty
around these values (upper confidence interval), some MS may have higher risk of RVF introduction of
one epidemic every 20 years (Belgium, Greece, Luxemburg, Portugal and UK) upper confidence
interval 0.04 epidemics/year, Figure 10), and the Netherlands and Malta may have one epidemic per
year (upper CI above 1, Figure 10). This may be linked to the number of connections by air and sea
transport that may lead to introducing positive RVF vectors from affected areas. According to the
median values, MINTRISK elaborates the qualitative scores (see Annex A.4).
Table 10 shows the results of the qualitative categorisation of MINTRISK outputs for the different
components of the risk of introduction and the overall score for each MS (For the numeric scores, see
Annex A.5)
Table 10: Qualitative model outputs of entry, transmission and overall introduction RVF for each
MSs
Country Entry score
Level of
transmission
Establishment
Overall score of
introduction
pathways animal vector animal vector animal vector animal vector
AT very low very low moderate moderate very low/low very low/low very low very low
BE very low very low moderate moderate high very high very low very low/low
BG very low very low moderate moderate very low very low/low very low very low
HR very low very low moderate moderate moderate/high very low very low very low
CY very low very low/low moderate moderate high/very high moderate/high very low very low
CZ very low very low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
DK very low very low/low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
EE very low very low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
FI very low very low moderate very low very low very low very low very low
FR very low very low/low moderate moderate moderate/high low/moderate very low very low
DE very low very low/low moderate moderate very low/low very low/low very low very low
EL very low very low moderate moderate very high very high very low very low/low
HU very low very low moderate moderate low/moderate very low very low very low
IE very low very low moderate moderate very low moderate/high very low very low
IT very low very low moderate moderate high/very high moderate/high very low very low
LV very low very low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
LT very low very low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
LU very low very low moderate moderate moderate high very low very low
MT very low very low/low moderate moderate very high very high very low very low/low
NL very low very low/low moderate moderate high very high very low very low/low
PL very low very low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
PT very low very low/low moderate moderate very high high very low very low
RO very low very low moderate moderate low/moderate low/moderate very low very low
SK very low very low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
SI very low very low moderate moderate low/moderate very low/low very low very low
ES very low/low very low moderate moderate low/moderate very low very low very low
SE very low very low moderate moderate very low very low very low very low
UK very low very low moderate moderate very low high/very high very low very low
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3.2.4.2. Risk of introduction of RVF into EU regions
According to the methodology described in Section 2.2.2, the risk of introduction for both vector
and animal pathways for the four EU regions considered in the previous EFSA opinion on vector-borne
disease (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, 2017) results as in Figure 13.
The values reported in the graph are as below:
• Southern region (Spain, Greece, Malta, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, Portugal, Cyprus): median:
0.002; CI: 1.84*104-0.028;
• Western region (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Austria): median:
0.002; CI: 1.35*104;0.03;
• Northern region (Lithuania, Denmark, Latvia, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Sweden, United
Kingdom): median: 0.00086; CI: 1.22*105;0.0205;
• Eastern region (Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania): median: 2.8*10-5; CI:
5.71*107; 0.0011.
According to the categorisation as form the MINTRISK model (Annex A.4), all the regions would be
categorised as having a very low risk of introduction of RVF, even considering the upper bound, that is
still below 0.15 (threshold value for ‘very low’, Annex A.4).
4. Conclusions
ToR 1.1. Global epidemiological situation of RVF
Virus
• RVFV consists of a single serotype of the genus Phlebovirus with a limited genomic variability
among the circulating strains. The virus is readily inactivated by lipid solvents and acid
conditions (pH < 6)
Spatial temporal distribution
• RVF has been historically present in sub-Saharan areas and in specific zones of the Arabian
Peninsula, in the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
• In the last two decades, more evidence has been observed on the spread of RVFV into new
African areas not regarded as infected before, even in areas considered not optimal for
mosquito-borne diseases, like the pre-desertic areas of Sahel.
• Historically major RVF epidemics have been cyclically observed in endemic areas, with long
inter-epizootic periods (5–15 years) during which the virus was not detected in animal
populations. In the last decade, RVF epidemics have been recorded more frequently and low-
level enzootic RVFV circulation in livestock has been demonstrated in various areas.
Figure 13: Overall introduction rate for the four EU regions
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• There have been recent outbreaks in French overseas departments and seropositive cases
detected in Turkey, Tunisia and Libya, what has raised concerns on the potential risk for
introduction into neighbouring EU countries.
• Positive serological findings in Algeria, Western Sahara, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, which
are countries considered officially free from RVF, must be carefully interpreted on the bases of
the study designs and diagnostic tests used. However, the detection of serological positive
individuals (animals or humans) in these countries must be seen as a signal of a potential risk
of RVF spread out of its endemic geographical area.
Transmission
• RVFV transmission is driven by several species of mosquitoes. Species belonging to Aedes and
Culex genus are the most relevant for enzootic and epizootic cycles, respectively.
• Epizootic transmission is favoured by particular climatic conditions, such as heavy rains.
• Vertical transmission of the virus has been described in one species of vectors; however, its
role on the survival of the virus during inter-epizootic periods remains unclear.
Possible expansion of RVF
• The movement of live animals is the main risk factor for RVF spread from the African endemic
areas.
• Several pathways of livestock movements between sub-Saharan and North African countries
can be identified. It is reasonable to assume that a large part of these cross-borders
movements is currently not subjected to veterinary checks.
• The trade from the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula and Middle East involves
several million live animals each year, thus representing a constant risk of RVF introduction into
the Middle East.
Diagnosis
• Molecular assays are available to detect RVFV, including DIVA test (gel-based and RT PCR).
• Serological tests are available to detect RVF antibodies and to distinguish early from past
infection of RVF in domestic ruminants.
• In the EU, the diagnostic capacity of the laboratories has been assessed and the level of
performance considered adequate, as well as in National Laboratories from Algeria, Mauritania,
Morocco, Tunisia, Mali and Senegal.
• RVF diagnostic tests are in place in most of the other Mediterranean countries; nevertheless,
an evaluation of their performances should be encouraged through inter laboratory trials.
Vaccines
• No vaccines have been authorised for use in the EU. Their use for emergency vaccination
should be on an ad hoc basis and authorised following the proper EU procedure.
• Both live-attenuated and inactivated vaccines are commercially available for RVF and have
contributed significantly to the control of RVF in endemic countries. However, they require
repeated vaccinations (inactivated vaccines) and retain the risk for teratogenic effects, abortion
and potential reassortment/reversion to virulence (live attenuated).
• Several novel candidate vaccines are in the final stages of validation and, among them, most
allow the discrimination of naturally infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA).
• Preventive mass vaccination is the most effective means to control RVF circulation when
climatic, environmental and epidemiological evaluations suggest a high probability of RVF
outbreaks. However, the use of vaccines should be carefully evaluated once the virus
transmission has already been detected in the area since it may intensify transmission among
herds through needle propagation of the virus.
TOR 1.2 and 1.3 Risk of introduction into EU
Pathways of possible introduction of RVF into EU
• Among the possible pathways for RVF introduction into the EU, the movements of infected
animals (traded or uncontrolled movements) and movements of infected vectors by active
flight or their passive movements when shipped by flight, containers or road transport are
considered as plausible pathways of introduction and were further considered in the
assessment.
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Rate of entry
• The rate of RVFV entry into the EU MS through the entry of infected animals was assessed by
MINTRISK scale as ‘very low’, whereas the entry of infected vectors was considered ‘very low’ or
‘low’. In particular, the highest values of the rate of entry have been assessed for France (median:
0.000282 entries/year; CI: 8.9*107; 0.056), Germany (median: 0.000251 entries/year; CI:
3.9*107; 0.11) and the Netherlands (median: 0.000251 entries/year; CI: 106; 0.056), due to
the greater number of connections by air and sea transport with African RVF-infected countries.
• Due to the level of uncertainty, further countries (Cyprus, Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta,
Portugal) showed greater rates of entry of vectors (up to 0.06 entries per year) when the
upper 95% confidence values are considered. This level of uncertainty is linked to the number
of air and sea connections between affected country and MSs, especially the maritime
connections generate higher uncertainty for the survival of mosquitoes at destination.
Level of transmission
• For all MS, a ‘moderate’ level of transmission (R0) has been assessed (median value 1.77; CI:
0.47–6.68). In fact, the input variables for the estimation of this parameter (distribution of
vectors in the countries, estimated value of the basic reproduction ratio, fraction of the host
population being susceptible) are the same for all MSs.
Probability of establishment
• The probability of the establishment of RVFV transmission, once introduced, varies among the
EU MS according to the introduction pathway considered:
o For the introduction through infected animals, a ‘very high’ probability (median: 0.28, CI:
0.11–0.71) of RVFV transmission establishment has been assessed for Greece, Malta and
Portugal, ‘high to very high’ for Cyprus (median: 0.1, CI: 0.02–0.35) and Italy (median: 0.1,
CI: 0.02–0.35); ‘high’ probability is considered for Belgium (median: 0.028, CI: 0.01–0.071)
and the Netherlands (median: 0.028, CI: 0.011–0.071); ‘moderate to high’ for Croatia
(median: 0.01, CI: 0.002–0.039) and France (median: 0.01, CI: 0.002–0.035).
o For the introduction through infected vectors, ‘very high’ probability of RVFV transmission
establishment is assessed for Belgium (median: 0.28, CI: 0.12–0.70), Greece (median: 0.28,
CI: 0.12–0.70), Malta (median: 0.28, CI: 0.12–0.70) and the Netherlands (median: 0.28, CI:
0.12–0.70), ‘high to very high’ for United Kingdom (median: 0.1; CI: 0.028–0.35), ‘high’
probability is reported for Luxembourg, Portugal(median: 0.028; CI: 0.012; 0.07); ‘moderate
to high’ for Cyprus, Ireland, Italy (median: 0.01; CI: 0.0028; 0.035). The uncertainty around
those values comprised in certain cases more than one qualitative category.
• The differences observed between the probability estimates of the two introduction pathways
(animal or vector) are mainly due to differences in host density between the countries, and the
climatic conditions, which are inputs for the estimation of probability of the first transmission
step following the introduction of infected vectors.
Overall rate of introduction
• Although the results of the assessment indicate that the risk of RVFV introduction into the EU
is currently very low, higher risk values have been estimated following the introduction of
infected vectors.
• For the animal pathway, the risk of RVF introduction into the EU is very low for all the EU MSs
(less than 0.002 epidemics/year, i.e. one epidemic every 500 years, as the worst-case scenario,
the highest upper confidence level estimated), given the strict health policy in place in the EU
on the import of live animals from RVF infected Third Countries and due the long distance
between the countries actually infected by RVF and the EU borders.
• For the vector pathway, the risk is very low for the great majority of MSs, but it is very low to
low, when considering the median values, for Netherlands with 0.0044 epidemics/year (CI:
2.51*105; 1.58), meaning one epidemic every 227 years, followed by Malta with 0.0025
epidemics/year (CI: 5.62*106; 0.1.25), Belgium and Greece (0.0014 epidemics/year, CI:
4.47*106; 0.39, one epidemic every 700 years). In the worst-case scenario and considering
the uncertainty around these values (upper confidence intervals), some MS may have a higher
risk of RVF introduction (0.04 epidemics/year for Belgium, Greece, Luxemburg, Portugal and
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UK), and the Netherlands and Malta may have one epidemic per year. This is mainly linked to
the number of connections by air and sea transport with African RVF-infected countries.
• Considering the four EU regions, all of them are categorised as at very low risk of introduction
of RVF, Southern region (median: 0.002; CI: 1.84*104–0.028), Western (median: 0.002; CI:
1.35*10-4–0.03); Northern (median: 0.00086; CI: 1.22*105–0.0205); Eastern region (median:
2.8*105; CI: 5.71*107 – 0.0011).
5. Recommendations
• Considering the possible future source of risk represented by the spread of infection into new
areas closer to the EU borders, it is of paramount importance for the EU to establish and
maintain a close collaboration with North African and Middle Eastern countries in the
surveillance of possible introduction of RVF from currently infected areas, as well as to
carefully monitor the evolution of the epidemics in African countries.
• Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an immediate risk of RVFV
introduction, the evolution in the global situation of RVF occurrence, the risk of further
spreading of infection into countries closer to the EU borders and the risks linked to the
possible introduction of infected vectors, suggest EU authorities to strengthen, improve and
harmonise their surveillance and response capacities as well as their scientific and technical
expertise to be better prepared in case of RVFV introduction.
• Considering that higher risk values were estimated for the introduction of infected vectors, it is
recommended to integrate the surveillance systems already in place in the EU for invasive
mosquitoes, taking into account the main possible points of entry of RVFV-infected vectors.
Particular attention should be given to those countries receiving major air and sea traffic from
RVF-affected countries.
• Despite disinsection procedures being compulsory in some cases and widely recommended by
WHO and IATA, it is still important to have additional data about the efficacy of the treatments
conducted in airplanes and ships in order to avoid the entry of vectors arriving from RVF-
affected countries.
• Considering a possible introduction of RVFV in the EU, information about the potential
mosquito vector species associated to livestock premises and the surrounded environment will
be essential to develop adequate protocols for vector control.
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Annex A –
A.1. Estimated number of imported vectors
For combining the values of vectors moved along the two pathways into one, the following is used:
ðvectors moved by air  P2airÞ þ ðvectors moved by sea  P2seaÞ20
For calculating the uncertainty level for the combined values of vectors moved along both pathways:
Let : UN = upCI; LN = lowCI;UP2 = 97.5% P2 and LP2 = 2.5% P2
Uncertainty ¼ ½ðUNsea  UP2sea þ UNair  UP2airÞ  ðLNsea  LP2sea þ LNair  LP2airÞ=2½ðNsea  P2sea þ Nair  P2airÞ
Then, the results of uncertainty X are classified as :
X\ ¼ 0:1! Low; 0:1\X\ ¼ 0:3! Moderate; 0:3\X! High
See Table A.1 below for all values (Van Bortel et al., 2020).
Table A.1: Estimated number of imported vectors per type of transport
Country Transport
No. vector
moved/year
Lower CIUpper CI Uncertainty Transport
No. vector
moved/
year
Lower CI Upper CI Uncertainty
Combined
air + sea
Uncertainty
category
Austria sea 0 0 0 0 air 7.619 6.814 8.411 0.1048038 7.344716 moderate
Belgium sea 4.434 3.934 4.945 0.11400541 air 12.479 10.982 14.037 0.1224056 13.812224 moderate
Bulgaria sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Croatia sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Cyprus sea 0.017 0.01 0.026 0.47058824 air 0.012 0.006 0.02 0.5833333 0.020459 high
Czechia sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Denmark sea 0.002 0 0.005 1.25 air 0.012 0.006 0.02 0.5833333 0.01247 high
Estonia sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Finland sea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 low
France sea 0.885 0.783 0.993 0.11864407 air 601.379 555.043 647.849 0.077161 580.238231 low
20 See Annex A.2.
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Country Transport
No. vector
moved/year
Lower CIUpper CI Uncertainty Transport
No. vector
moved/
year
Lower CI Upper CI Uncertainty
Combined
air + sea
Uncertainty
category
Germany sea 5.327 4.727 5.965 0.11620049 air 858.709 782.014 938.435 0.0910792 829.835717 moderate
Greece sea 0.052 0.038 0.067 0.27884615 air 0.171 0.141 0.204 0.1842105 0.191364 moderate
Hungary sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Ireland sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Italy sea 1.115 0.973 1.262 0.12959641 air 98.736 90.738 106.836 0.0815204 95.627504 moderate
Latvia sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Lithuania sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Luxembourg sea 0 0 0 0 air 0.028 0.018 0.04 0.3928571 0.026992 high
Malta sea 0.017 0.01 0.026 0.47058824 air 0 0 0 0 0.0068 high
Netherlands sea 15.504 13.791 17.281 0.1125516 air 770.358 711.589 831.024 0.0775192 748.749192 moderate
Poland sea 0 0 0 0 air 18.446 16.233 20.773 0.1230619 17.781944 moderate
Portugal sea 0.17 0.141 0.202 0.17941176 air 0.028 0.018 0.039 0.375 0.112502 high
Romania sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0.001 0 0 low
Slovakia sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0.002 0 0 low
Slovenia sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 low
Spain sea 6.954 6.18 7.761 0.11367558 air 65.534 58.665 72.516 0.105678 67.152464 moderate
Sweden sea 0 0 0 0 air 0.272 0.21 0.341 0.2408088 0.262208 moderate
UK sea 0 0 0 0 air 0 0 0 0 0 moderate
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A.2. Estimation of mosquito survival in sea and air transport
In Table A.2, the survival of vectors during transport by flight or by sea transport is indicated.
Table A.2: Estimation of mosquito survival in sea and air transport
Country
P2 – probability of survival
Air Maritime
mean 2.50% 97.50%
uncertainty
level
mean 2.50% 97.50%
uncertainty
level
Austria 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Belgium 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.402 0.128 0.656 high
Bulgaria 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Croatia 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.794 0.629 0.883 moderate
Cyprus 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.523 0.194 0.814 high
Czechia 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Denmark 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.451 0.196 0.647 high
Estonia 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Finland 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
France 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.575 0.258 0.775 high
Germany 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.383 0.117 0.632 high
Greece 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.51 0.189 0.795 high
Hungary 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Ireland 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.506 0.247 0.689 high
Italy 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.4 0.141 0.646 high
Latvia 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Lithuania 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Luxembourg 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Malta 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.4 0.141 0.646 high
Netherlands 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.395 0.127 0.633 high
Poland 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Portugal 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.503 0.194 0.759 high
Romania 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.794 0.629 0.883 moderate
Slovakia 0.964 0.921 0.983 low
Slovenia 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.794 0.629 0.883 moderate
Spain 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.572 0.263 0.779 high
Sweden 0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.399 0.154 0.607 high
United
Kingdom
0.964 0.921 0.983 low 0.425 0.146 0.661 high
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A.3. Host density, vector presence and proportion of days above temperature threshold of 9.6°C
The three components are estimated as below:
• Vector: proportion of the country with any predicted RVF vector presence (Wint et al., 2020).
• Host: proportion of the country where the sum of density for sheep + goats + cattle > 50 animals/sqKM, or any of three deer species > 90% of
probability of presence.
• Temperature: mean daily temperature averaged of 2013–2018 per each MS capital city, calculate the proportion of days above 9.6°C per each MS
out of the total number of days in 5 years.
In Table A.3, the estimated parameters are presented.
Table A.3: Host density category, vector presence and temperature classes in all MS, and probability of first and second transmission step of RVF
Country Ruminants Area Density
Density_
category
proportion
country with
vector
presence
% days
above
9.6°C
Probability
first
transmission
step vectors
Probability
first
transmission
step cat vect
Probability
first
transmission
step animals
Probability
first
transmission
step cat
animals
Probability
second
transmission
step - combined
T°C, vector and
host
Probability
second
transmission
step category
Austria 2,422,310 83738.8450 28.9269574 0.019622181 0.804780876 0.626 0.110830886 moderate 0.709783649 moderate 0.214618137 Moderate
Belgium 2,640,170 30479.6110 86.6208562 0.058757999 0.998078155 0.606 0.188699092 very high 0.777711619 high 0.328776971 Very High
Bulgaria 2,209,260 110801.4860 19.9389023 0.013525265 0.905093066 0.6 0.090084176 low 0.736923225 moderate 0.1943853 Low
Croatia 1,296,270 56287.7890 23.0293288 0.01562161 0.988340459 0.619 0.098335024 low 0.78216542 very high 0.212214152 Moderate
Cyprus 488,490 9251.0000 52.8040212 0.03581884 0.741144414 0.888 0.178345536 high 0.811255964 very high 0.286731743 High
Czechia 1,662,640 78495.1740 21.1814296 0.014368115 0.412844037 0.537 0.08783893 low 0.470847372 very low 0.147136368 Very Low
Denmark 1,728,520 42670.7140 40.5083449 0.027478247 0.47323601 0.505 0.117798619 moderate 0.488860087 low 0.187263324 Low
Estonia 353,410 45544.5590 7.75965357 0.005263648 0.471465871 0.399 0.045827891 very low 0.433722126 very low 0.099671273 Very Low
Finland 1,070,320 333796.9510 3.20650023 0.002175083 0.050325707 0.4 0.029496324 very low 0.141881228 very low 0.035245896 Very Low
France 26,782,730 546728.9350 48.9872189 0.033229768 0.84562534 0.667 0.148876644 moderate 0.751020707 high 0.265629952 High
Germany 14,348,990 356108.7820 40.2938392 0.02733274 0.887859129 0.532 0.120586142 moderate 0.68727073 moderate 0.23459187 Moderate
Greece 12,389,010 131851.8520 93.9615926 0.063737481 0.899341142 0.873 0.235887305 very high 0.886072693 very high 0.368505974 Very High
Hungary 2,161,250 92782.1970 23.2938006 0.015801011 0.997734481 0.592 0.096717106 low 0.768543306 high 0.210542862 Low
Ireland 12,371,770 69384.1640 178.308266 0.120952821 0.155685441 0.545 0.256747517 very high 0.291287771 very low 0.217313564 Moderate
Italy 14,123,050 300979.4500 46.9236355 0.031829966 0.861845085 0.855 0.164968546 high 0.85841572 very high 0.286248905 High
Latvia 578,800 64298.8910 9.00171046 0.006106179 0.662634762 0.45 0.052419278 very low 0.546063772 low 0.122110244 Very Low
Lithuania 941,180 64849.1990 14.5133635 0.009844929 0.9626703 0.454 0.066855051 very low 0.661099324 moderate 0.16264798 Very Low
Luxembourg 215,500 2594.1160 83.0726151 0.056351101 1 0.546 0.175407244 high 0.738918128 moderate 0.313351431 Very High
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Country Ruminants Area Density
Density_
category
proportion
country with
vector
presence
% days
above
9.6°C
Probability
first
transmission
step vectors
Probability
first
transmission
step cat vect
Probability
first
transmission
step animals
Probability
first
transmission
step cat
animals
Probability
second
transmission
step - combined
T°C, vector and
host
Probability
second
transmission
step category
Malta 32,400 332.3660 97.4828954 0.066126105 1 0.996 0.256635151 very high 0.997997996 very high 0.403841327 Very High
Netherlands 5,534,930 35492.6890 155.945637 0.105783456 0.983723296 0.582 0.248124911 very high 0.756655112 high 0.392709341 Very High
Poland 6,248,900 310715.0620 20.1113521 0.013642243 0.798083964 0.514 0.083738361 low 0.640480411 low 0.177541206 Low
Portugal 4,156,760 91280.7050 45.538211 0.030890183 0.917357513 0.972 0.17327798 high 0.944283592 very high 0.302001054 Very High
Romania 12,328,610 236654.0270 52.0955006 0.035338226 0.86885691 0.63 0.149208184 moderate 0.739851237 moderate 0.268438322 High
Slovakia 842,930 48648.3070 17.3270161 0.01175353 0.713330547 0.576 0.08228021 low 0.640997968 low 0.169028733 Low
Slovenia 659,500 20245.6890 32.5748361 0.022096667 0.988247863 0.613 0.116384091 moderate 0.778328941 high 0.237438445 Moderate
Spain 24,443,430 498117.6110 49.0716037 0.033287009 0.473981425 0.715 0.154273172 high 0.582148365 low 0.224274921 Moderate
Sweden 2,067,070 443799.6830 4.65766444 0.003159459 0.121711358 0.432 0.036944367 very low 0.229301781 very low 0.054972125 Very Low
United
Kingdom
43,049,890 243137.1760 177.060089 0.120106138 0.289522399 0.646 0.27854724 very high 0.432471351 very low 0.282158603 High
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A.4. Assignment of qualitative categories by MINTRISK
The assignment of qualitative categories to the computed scores by MINTRISK and when
transformed into rate of entry, probability of establishment and overall risk of introduction is in
Table A.4.
A.5. MINTRISK outputs for the scores of entry, transmission,
establishment and overall score of introduction
In Table A.5 below, the MINTRISK scores are reported.
A score of 1 translates to 10 epidemics starting each year, a score of 0.8 translates to one epidemic
per year, 0.6 translates to 1 epidemic every 10 years etc. The overall introduction score (sc) translates
into the number of new epidemics/year (No. epidemics/year) using the following formula: No.
epidemics/year = 10^[5 * (score-0.8)].
Table A.4: Assignment of qualitative categories to the computed scores by MINTRISK
Risk level
scores as computed by
MINTRISK
Rate of entry and
probability of establishment
overall risk of introduction
Lower
boundary
Upper
boundary
Lower
boundary
Upper
boundary
Lower
boundary
Upper
boundary
Very low < 0.15 < 5.62E-05 < 0.000562
Very low/low 0.15 0.25 5.62E-05 0.000178 0.000562 0.001778
Low 0.25 0.35 0.000178 0.000562 0.001778 0.005623
Low/moderate 0.35 0.45 0.000562 0.001778 0.005623 0.017783
Moderate 0.45 0.55 0.001778 0.005623 0.017783 0.056234
Moderate/high 0.55 0.65 0.005623 0.017783 0.056234 0.177828
High 0.65 0.75 0.017783 0.056234 0.177828 0.562341
High/very
high
0.75 0.85 0.056234 0.177828 0.562341 1.778279
Very high > 0.85 > 0.177828 > 1.778279
Table A.5: MINTRISK scores calculated for RVF introduction into MSs
Country Entry score
Level of
transmission
Establishment
Overall score of
introduction
pathways animal vector animal vector animal vector animal vector
AT 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.14 (0.37;
0.65)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.2 (0.08;
0.32)
0.2 (0.09;
0.31)
1.39
(1.62;
1.16)
0.46
(0.97;
0.05)
BE 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.14 (0.37;
0.65)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.69 (0.61;
0.77)
0.89 (0.82;
0.97)
0.91
(1.12;
0.68)
0.23 (0.27;
0.72)
BG 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0 (0.12;
0.12)
0.2 (0.09;
0.31)
1.59
(1.82;
1.36)
0.52
(1.02;
0.03)
HR 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.35;
0.49)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.6 (0.48;
0.72)
0 (0.11;
0.11)
0.99
(1.22;
0.76)
0.72
(1.16;
0.3)
CY 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.21 (0.34;
0.76)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.8 (0.68;
0.91)
0.6 (0.49;
0.71)
0.8
(1.02;
0.56)
0 (0.54;
0.52)
CZ 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.6
(0.72;
0.48)
0.4
(0.51;
0.29)
2.19
(2.4;
1.96)
1.12
(1.62;
0.63)
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Country Entry score
Level of
transmission
Establishment
Overall score of
introduction
pathways animal vector animal vector animal vector animal vector
DK 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.21 (0.34;
0.76)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.2
(0.32;
0.08)
0 (0.11;
0.11)
1.79
(2.02;
1.56)
0.6
(1.14;
0.04)
EE 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.6
(0.72;
0.48)
0.6
(0.71;
0.49)
2.19
(2.4;
1.96)
1.32
(1.82;
0.83)
FI 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
1.33
(1.89;
0.98)
0.6
(0.72;
0.48)
0.6
(0.71;
0.49)
2.19
(2.4;
1.96)
1.45
(1.93;
1.09)
FR 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.29 (0.21;
0.75)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.6 (0.48;
0.71)
0.4 (0.29;
0.51)
1 (1.22;
0.76)
0.12
(0.62;
0.35)
DE 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.28 (0.28;
0.81)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.2 (0.08;
0.32)
0.2 (0.09;
0.31)
1.39
(1.62;
1.16)
0.33
(0.86;
0.21)
EL 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.14 (0.37;
0.65)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.89 (0.81;
0.97)
0.89 (0.82;
0.97)
0.71
(0.92;
0.48)
0.23 (0.27;
0.72)
HU 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.4 (0.28;
0.52)
0.2
(0.31;
0.09)
1.19
(1.42;
0.96)
0.92
(1.42;
0.43)
IE 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.2
(0.32;
0.08)
0.6 (0.49;
0.71)
1.79
(2.02;
1.56)
0.12
(0.62;
0.35)
IT 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.14 (0.37;
0.65)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.8 (0.68;
0.91)
0.6 (0.49;
0.71)
0.8
(1.02;
0.56)
0.06
(0.57;
0.44)
LV 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.4
(0.52;
0.28)
0.6
(0.71;
0.49)
1.99
(2.22;
1.76)
1.32
(1.82;
0.83)
LT 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.2
(0.32;
0.08)
0.6
(0.71;
0.49)
1.79
(2.02;
1.56)
1.32
(1.82;
0.83)
LU 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.21 (0.34;
0.76)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.49 (0.41;
0.57)
0.69 (0.62;
0.77)
1.11
(1.32;
0.88)
0.1 (0.45;
0.62)
MT 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.21 (0.34;
0.76)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.89 (0.81;
0.97)
0.89 (0.82;
0.97)
0.71
(0.92;
0.48)
0.28 (0.25;
0.82)
NL 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.28 (0.2;
0.75)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.69 (0.61;
0.77)
0.89 (0.82;
0.97)
0.91
(1.12;
0.68)
0.33 (0.12;
0.84)
PL 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.14 (0.37;
0.65)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.2
(0.32;
0.08)
0.2
(0.31;
0.09)
1.79
(2.02;
1.56)
0.86
(1.37;
0.35)
PT 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.21 (0.34;
0.76)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.89 (0.81;
0.97)
0.69 (0.62;
0.77)
0.71
(0.92;
0.48)
0.1 (0.45;
0.62)
RO 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.4 (0.28;
0.51)
0.4 (0.29;
0.51)
1.2
(1.42;
0.96)
0.32
(0.82;
0.17)
SK 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.2
(0.32;
0.08)
0.2
(0.31;
0.09)
1.79
(2.02;
1.56)
0.92
(1.42;
0.43)
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Country Entry score
Level of
transmission
Establishment
Overall score of
introduction
pathways animal vector animal vector animal vector animal vector
SI 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.4 (0.28;
0.52)
0.2 (0.09;
0.31)
1.19
(1.42;
0.96)
0.52
(1.02;
0.03)
ES 0.17 (0.3;
0.66)
0.8
(0.99;
0.58)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.4 (0.28;
0.52)
0 (0.11;
0.11)
0.23
(0.71;
0.28)
1.6
(1.82;
1.37)
SE 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.14 (0.37;
0.65)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0.6
(0.72;
0.48)
0.6
(0.71;
0.49)
2.19
(2.4;
1.96)
1.26
(1.77;
0.75)
UK 0.8
(0.99;
0.59)
0.09 (0.41;
0.55)
0.5 (0.27;
0.73)
0.5 (0.27;
0.74)
0 (0.12;
0.11)
0.8 (0.69;
0.91)
1.6
(1.82;
1.36)
0.08 (0.42;
0.55)
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